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The “Too Big to Fail” Problem 
Saule T. Omarova† 
  INTRODUCTION   
The phrase “too big to fail”—or “TBTF”—is a popular meta-
phor for one of the core dysfunctions of today’s financial system: 
the recurrent pattern of government bailouts of large, systemi-
cally important financial institutions.1 It is by no means a new 
phenomenon. The “too-big-to-fail” label became famous in 1984, 
in connection with the crisis involving Continental Illinois Na-
tional Bank and Trust Company.2 The phrase itself, however, is 
even older than that: in 1975, for example, public commentators 
and media used it to describe the government rescue of Lockheed 
Corporation.3 
The global financial crisis of 2008 brought the TBTF phe-
nomenon into the spotlight and breathed new life into the old 
 
†  Saule T. Omarova is a Professor of Law and Public Affairs at Cornell 
University. I would like to thank the organizers of and participants in the Min-
nesota Law Review Symposium, “Recession in Retrospect: Financial Regulation 
and Consumer Protection Ten Years Since the 2008 Financial Crisis” (Oct. 12, 
2018). Special thanks to Claire Hill, Robert Hockett, and Patricia McCoy. All 
errors are my own. Copyright © 2019 by Saule T. Omarova. 
 1. See, e.g., William Safire, Too Big to Fail or to Bail Out?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 6, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/opinion/06iht-edsafire.1.1 
1699108.html?_r=1 (“Before too big to fail became a nervously practical answer 
to the worry about moral hazard, the word coined to describe the method used 
to rescue a financial entity from the consequences of risky or irresponsible be-
havior was bailout.”). 
 2. See generally FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES–LESSONS FOR THE FU-
TURE: VOLUME I: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND 
EARLY 1990S 235–57 (1997), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_ 
258.pdf (discussing the historical context in which the phrase “too big to fail” 
came to refer to the practice of regulatory forbearance with respect to large 
banks on the brink of failure). 
 3. See Amy Farber, Historical Echoes: “Too Big to Fail” Is One Big Phrase, 
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metaphor.4 In 2008–2009, to contain a systemic calamity, the 
governments in the United States and Europe rolled out massive 
capital and liquidity support programs not only for banks but 
also for large nonbank financial institutions, including invest-
ment banks, money market mutual funds, and insurers.5 At the 
time, the sheer scale and visibility of these stabilization efforts 
created a significant political backlash against government 
bailouts as a policy tool.6 
Ironically, however, the crisis containment measures re-
sulted in the creation of fewer and bigger financial institutions.7 
The post-crisis increase in the level of concentration of the U.S. 
financial industry is difficult to deny. For example, as of the 
year-end 2017, top five U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) 
held forty-eight percent of the country’s BHC assets.8 By early 
2018, there were four U.S. BHCs with more than $1.9 trillion in 
assets on their individual balance sheets.9 Despite the post-crisis 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act,10 the most wide-ranging regula-
tory reform in the U.S. financial sector since the 1930s,11 TBTF 
 
 4. See generally MARK LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42150, SYS-
TEMICALLY IMPORTANT OR “TOO BIG TO FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2018) 
(examining the TBTF phenomenon in the context of the 2008 financial crisis 
and the post-crisis period). 
 5. For a comprehensive overview of these programs in the United States, 
see generally Xiaoxi Liu, The Costs of Bailouts in the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, 
22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 417 (2017). 
 6. See generally Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 
(2011) (analyzing issues of political legitimacy and accountability arising in con-
nection with bailouts); Joseph E. Stiglitz, U.S. Does Not Have Capitalism Now, 
CNBC (Jan. 19, 2010), https://www.cnbc.com/id/34921639 (criticizing the lack 
of accountability by financial managers for their mistakes, blamed in part on 
bailouts). 
 7. See Matt Egan, Too-Big-to-Fail Banks Keep Getting Bigger, CNN: BUS. 
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/21/investing/banks-too-big-to 
-fail-jpmorgan-bank-of-america/index.html (“[O]ut of the 30 too-big-to-fail 
banks, about three-quarters of them are significantly bigger than a decade 
ago . . . .”); Yalman Onaran, Too Big to Fail, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/big-fail (“There are some 6,000 banks in 
the U.S. The biggest six have $10 trillion in assets, almost twice as much as the 
next 30 combined. The six biggest banks in the U.S. and Europe have increased 
their assets more than five-fold since 1997. That’s a lot of money in a small 
number of hands.”). 
 8. LABONTE, supra note 4, at 2. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
 11. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on 21st Cen-
tury Financial Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse 
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remains a “live” issue on the public policy agenda and continues 
to generate intense academic and political debates.12 
Importantly, “TBTF” is a rhetorically potent device, which 
explains the popularity of multiple variations on the “too big” 
theme in academic and popular discussions.13 The phrase is not 
only extremely capacious but also emotionally charged. It 
strongly conveys a clear sense of fundamental unfairness, the 
“wrongfulness” of granting the ultimate privilege of invincibility 
to the most powerful financial conglomerates. A full decade after 
the crisis nearly destroyed global financial markets, the TBTF 
label effectively crystallizes the widely shared discontent with 
the financial system.14 Yet, it is surprisingly conceptually impre-
cise. Despite the significant and rapidly growing scholarly liter-
ature discussing various aspects of the TBTF phenomenon, the 
 
.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-regulatory-reform (describing 
the proposed Dodd-Frank Act as “a sweeping overhaul of the financial regula-
tory system, a transformation on a scale not seen since the reforms that followed 
the Great Depression”). 
 12. During his Senate confirmation hearing in late 2017, Jerome Powell, 
now the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, famously proclaimed that the TBTF 
problem ceased to exist. See Jeffry Bartash, Powell Says the U.S. No Longer Has 
Too-Big-to-Fail Banks, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www 
.marketwatch.com/story/powell-says-the-us-no-longer-has-too-big-to-fail-banks 
-2017-11-28. Many disagree with this assessment, however. See Dennis Kelle-
her, ‘Too Big to Fail’ Is Alive and Kicking, AM. BANKER (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/too-big-to-fail-is-alive-and-kicking 
(arguing that the Trump administration’s rollback of “the Dodd-Frank law and 
many of its implementing rules” exacerbates the too-big-to-fail problem). For a 
recent official proposal targeting the TBTF problem, see generally FED. RES. 
BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END TOO BIG TO FAIL 
(2017) [hereinafter THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN], https://www.minneapolisfed.org/ 
~/media/files/publications/studies/endingtbtf/the-minneapolis-plan/the 
-minneapolis-plan-to-end-too-big-to-fail-final.pdf?la=en. 
 13. See Amanda Aronczyk, Too Big to Fail Is Too Hard to Resist, MARKET-
PLACE (Apr. 5, 2011), https://www.marketplace.org/2011/04/05/business/ 
economy-40/too-big-fail-too-hard-resist (citing phrases like “too big to save” and 
“too big to sue” and suggesting that “part of the charm of [the phrase] is that it’s 
counterintuitive”); Andrew Hill, When Is A Company Too Big To Manage? FIN. 
TIMES (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/87395500-bdd2-11e4-8cf3 
-00144feab7de (using the phrase “too big to manage” to explain internal control 
failures at large banks); Gretchen Morgenson, A Bank Too Big To Jail, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/business/a-bank 
-too-big-to-jail.html (using the phrase “too big to jail” to describe the practice of 
avoiding imposition of stiff criminal penalties on big banks). 
 14. See Kelleher, supra note 12; see also sources cited supra note 7 (discuss-
ing how the increased size of many banks in the last decade keeps afloat issues 
associate with TBTF) . 
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analytical substance of that term remains remarkably unclear.15 
In many ways, it still functions as the discursive equivalent of 
the common “you know it when you see it” approach. 
The purpose of this Article is to take a fresh, deeper, and 
more sustained look at the nature of the TBTF problem in fi-
nance, and to offer a coherent framework for understanding the 
cluster of closely related, but analytically distinct, regulatory 
and policy challenges this label actually denotes. To be clear, this  
Article is not intended as a comprehensive technical analysis of 
the key determinants of, and policy responses to, the TBTF phe-
nomenon. It seeks neither to dissect any particular scholarly ar-
gument on this broad topic nor to critique any particular regula-
tory measure in this area. The approach here is deliberately 
high-level and taxonomic: this is a broad field-mapping exercise, 
a thought-organizing and clarifying experiment. Developing this 
type of a conceptual map is of critical importance. A careful de-
construction—and rediscovery—of the full meaning of the TBTF 
metaphor elucidates the fundamental reasons for the continuing 
persistence of the TBTF phenomenon in the financial sector. It 
also enables us to start envisioning new, potentially more effec-
tive and integrated solutions to the TBTF problem. 
The Article is organized as follows. Part I of the Article be-
gins by breaking down the TBTF metaphor into two interrelated 
but conceptually distinct components—one focused on the failure 
of a large financial firm, and another focused primarily on its 
size—and discussing the fundamental tension between the “mi-
cro” and “macro” levels of analysis implicit in this duality. Part 
II uses this basic framework to make sense of the wide-ranging 
post-2008 efforts to combat the TBTF problem and demonstrates 
the predominantly micro-level, entity-centric nature of such ef-
forts. Part III examines the resulting inability of the key post-
crisis regulatory reforms to address TBTF as a systemic, macro-
level problem. Part IV sketches out potential ways of filling the 
gaps in the current TBTF policy by expanding and strengthening 
the more explicitly macro-level, structural approaches to this 
complex, multifaceted problem. 
 
 15. For a glimpse of the wide-ranging literature on TBTF as a financial-
sector phenomenon, see generally SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANK-
ERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 
(2010); GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF 
BANK BAILOUTS (2004). 
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I.  DECONSTRUCTING TBTF: A PARADOX INSIDE THE 
METAPHOR   
At the heart of the TBTF problem, there is a fundamental 
paradox: TBTF is an entity-centric, micro-level metaphor for a 
cluster of interrelated systemic, macro-level problems. This in-
herent conceptual tension between the micro and the macro, the 
entity and the system, frames much of the public policy debate on 
TBTF. It also renders TBTF a uniquely complex and multi-
layered phenomenon and explains, on a deeper level, the seem-
ingly intractable and persistent nature of the TBTF problem.16 
Yet, to date, this critically important internal tension has 
gone largely unnoticed—and its analytical implications unrecog-
nized—by scholars and policymakers grappling with numerous 
specific aspects and manifestations of the TBTF phenomenon. 
Despite the enormous amount of post-crisis learning and exper-
imentation, there remains a significant gap in our collective un-
derstanding of the TBTF problem. To fill this gap, it may be help-
ful to begin by broadening our theoretical lens and exploring the 
hidden meaning of the TBTF metaphor. 
Intuitively, the easiest method of deconstructing TBTF is to 
break the concept into two principal components corresponding 
to the two letters that give the acronym its meaning: the letter 
“B” and the letter “F.” For ease of reference, I call these two com-
ponents the “B factor” and the “F factor,” respectively. Despite 
its apparent simplicity, this technique yields important new in-
sights into the complex inner dynamics of the all-too-familiar 
TBTF problem. 
A. THE “F” FACTOR: “FAILURE” IN FOCUS 
What I call here the “F factor” is by far the more salient and 
widely discussed component of the TBTF phenomenon. 
The letter “F” in the acronym stands for a “failure” of a par-
ticular financial institution. The “F” factor, accordingly, denotes 
bailouts or various forms of government rescue of financial firms 
on the brink of insolvency. Historically, the phrase “too big to 
fail” emerged directly in response to, and in the context of, such 
government rescue efforts.17 It is, therefore, hardly surprising 
that public discussions on the TBTF problem continue to revolve 
primarily around the ever-present possibility of government 
bailouts of failing financial institutions. 
 
 16. See infra Parts II–III. 
 17. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
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The continuing discursive and practical emphasis on the “F” 
factor also reflects the heightened normative salience of large fi-
nancial institutions’ seeming immunity to failure. Because 
bailouts involve publicly funded assistance to privately owned 
firms, whose financial woes are a direct result of their own profit-
seeking activities, they tend to trigger negative reactions across 
the political spectrum.18 At bottom, a bailout is the ultimate 
manifestation of the infamous dynamics of “privatization of 
gains, socialization of losses.”19 It exemplifies the fundamental 
unfairness of the situation in which a firm that fully enjoyed the 
benefits of being a free market participant when things were go-
ing well repudiates the basic rules of the free market when its 
business decisions bring it to the brink of collapse. 
Relatedly, government bailouts of private firms evoke an ar-
ray of explicitly distributional concerns.20 An actual rescue of a 
large financial institution is an extraordinary act, a direct grant 
of explicit and tangible public subsidy not available to smaller 
entities. Moreover, the sheer expectation that the government 
will always bail out TBTF financial institutions, internalized by 
other market participants, generates the specter of implicit pub-
lic subsidy of such institutions’ private risk-taking.21 The well-
known notion of “moral hazard” captures the economic inefficien-
cies associated with this implicit subsidy: large firms shielded 
from the negative consequences of their risk-taking have an in-
centive to take greater risks than they otherwise would.22 While 
it is notoriously difficult to quantify the implicit TBTF subsidy, 
there is hardly any confusion about the fundamental unfairness 
and uneven distributional consequences of this pattern: the most 
 
 18. See Levitin, supra note 6 (explaining complex political dynamics sur-
rounding bailouts). 
 19. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, U.S. Does Not Have Capitalism Now, CNBC 
(Jan. 19, 2010), https://www.cnbc.com/id/34921639 (criticizing today’s system in 
which managers do not bear the costs of their mistakes as a system in which 
“you socialize the losses and privatize the gains”). 
 20. Levitin, supra note 6, at 452 (“Concerns about the systemic risk posed 
by TBTF firms are ultimately distributional anxieties. It is the fear of the broad-
est macroeconomic impact—that everyone will be affected—that animates dis-
cussions of systemic risk. While macroeconomic impacts are broadly felt by eve-
ryone, they are not felt equally. Some are harmed more than others, and some 
might even benefit.”). 
 21. For a review of the literature on the TBTF subsidy prepared by the staff 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), see generally TBTF 
Study for Large Banks: Literature Review, FDIC (Aug. 2014), https://www.fdic 
.gov/news/news/speeches/literature-review.pdf. 
 22. See LABONTE, supra note 4, at 5. 
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vulnerable members of society typically end up bearing the dis-
proportionate share of losses caused by TBTF firms’ risky behav-
ior.23 
In this sense, bailouts violate the ideologically enshrined 
public-private boundary in finance and expose the porous and 
negotiated nature of that boundary.24 On a deeper level, there-
fore, TBTF is a public-private boundary problem and, by exten-
sion, a problem of political legitimacy.25 These political dynamics 
built into the “F” factor are especially visible during a systemic 
crisis when bailouts of TBTF firms constitute a concerted gov-
ernment strategy of crisis containment.26 
To sum up, the interplay of these considerations explains 
why the focus of the ongoing debate on the TBTF problem re-
mains primarily on the failure of an individual firm, or the “F” 
factor. Placing the undesirable macro-level effects of certain fi-
nancial firms’ failure at the core of the TBTF problem gives the 
debate a degree of conceptual and normative clarity, which is 
critical from the perspective of devising and implementing spe-
cific policy responses. 
B. THE “B” FACTOR: “BIGNESS” IN THE BACKGROUND 
In contrast to the “F” factor, the “B” factor generally remains 
in the background of the academic and policy discussions of 
 
 23. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Community Devel-
opment in Challenging Times, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Community Af-
fairs Research Conference (Apr. 29, 2011), https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/bernanke20110429a.htm (stating that poor communities 
and individuals have been hit the hardest by the economic problems in the af-
termath of the financial crisis). 
 24. For in-depth discussions of the public-private balance in modern fi-
nance, see generally Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Private Wealth and 
Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. 437 
(2018) [hereinafter National Investment Authority]; Robert C. Hockett & Saule 
T. Omarova, “Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments as Market Actors, 
15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53 (2014); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Oma-
rova, Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103 (2015) [hereinafter Public Actors]; Robert C. Hockett 
& Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017) 
[hereinafter Finance Franchise]. 
 25. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 447 (“Political legitimacy is critical for en-
suring that government responses to financial crisis are effective.”). 
 26. See Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
1051 (2009) (arguing that, when facing the urgent task of containing an unfold-
ing financial crisis, governments inevitably make political decisions favoring 
specific private actors’ economic interests). 
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TBTF. There are several reasons for the muted discursive sali-
ence of the “B” factor. 
To start with, there is a significant ambiguity with respect 
to what exactly the “B” factor denotes. As used in the acronym 
TBTF, the letter “B” stands for “big” or “bigness.” Thus, on its 
face, it refers simply to the size of the firms’ balance sheets. Size, 
however, is itself mainly a proxy for an individual firm’s struc-
tural power and functional significance within the market. From 
this perspective, it makes sense to interpret the “B” factor as en-
compassing the much more capacious and multifaceted notion of 
individual firms’ “systemic importance.”27 Indeed, much of the 
public discussion of the TBTF phenomenon currently revolves 
around issues of identifying, regulating, and supervising so-
called “systemically important financial institutions,” or SIFIs.28 
The TBTF problem, accordingly, is often recast in terms of pre-
venting the failure—and avoiding bailouts—of SIFIs.29 
This melding of two concepts—TBTF and SIFI—dramati-
cally expands the analytical scope of the “B” factor. The size of 
an individual firm’s balance sheet—its “bigness” in a literal 
sense—becomes only one key metric of systemic significance; the 
others include the firm’s “interconnectedness,” complexity of its 
operations and structure, and degree of substitutability of its 
products and services.30 Isolating, measuring, and balancing 
 
 27. In fact, in a recent study of the TBTF subsidy, the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF)  deliberately used the term “too important to fail,” or “TITF,” 
instead of the more familiar TBTF. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINAN-
CIAL STABILITY REPORT: MOVING FROM LIQUIDITY- TO GROWTH-DRIVEN MAR-
KETS 102 (Apr. 2014) [hereinafter INT’L MONETARY FUND]. 
 28. See id. at 123. The Dodd-Frank Act established the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) and granted it authority to designate nonbank finan-
cial institutions as SIFIs, thereby subjecting them to consolidated prudential 
oversight by the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321(a), 5322(a)(2)(J), 5323(a)(1) 
(2012). 
 29. See, e.g., LABONTE, supra note 4, at 1 (defining TBTF as merely a “pop-
ular” term for SIFIs). 
 30. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GLOBALLY SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT BANKS: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE ADDITIONAL LOSS 
ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT 1–2 (Nov. 2011), https://www.bis.org/publ/d445 
.pdf. 
  
2019] THE “TOO BIG TO FAIL” PROBLEM 2503 
 
these and other related attributes, however, is notoriously diffi-
cult.31 It involves making numerous qualitative judgments lack-
ing the simplicity of a purely size-based scale.32 In effect, a sub-
stantively more capacious definition of the “B” factor opens it to 
competing interpretations and thus potentially blunts its impact 
as a policy tool. 
Even without this complicating interpretive twist, however, 
the “B” factor lacks the normative clarity and rhetorical appeal 
of the “F” factor. While a firm’s failure is an unambiguously bad 
thing, it is not necessarily the case with respect to its size. Unlike 
an actual failure of a big financial firm, the size of the firm, by 
itself, is not likely to trigger a cascade of other firms’ failures.33 
Although a particular firm’s size can amplify the impact of its 
actions on the stability of the market, size is fundamentally an 
attribute rather than an act. Moreover, the growing size of an 
individual firm’s balance sheet may actually generate beneficial 
economies of scale.34 Diversifying the firm’s assets—a factor that 
goes to that firm’s broader systemic importance rather than its 
“bigness”—may also generate potentially beneficial economies of 
scope.35 The importance of economies of scale and scope in the 
provision of financial services makes it much more difficult to 
define the normative baseline for assessing the effects of the “B” 
factor. 
 
 31. The bitter fight over designation of MetLife, a large insurance conglom-
erate, as a SIFI subject to enhanced prudential supervision under the Dodd-
Frank Act provides a powerful illustration of these difficulties. See, e.g., John 
Heltman, FSOC Gives Up Effort to Designate MetLife as SIFI, AM. BANKER 
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/fsoc-gives-up-effort-to 
-designate-metlife-as-sifi.  
 32. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & FIN. STA-
BILITY BD., REPORT TO G-20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND GOVERNORS, GUIDANCE 
TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, 
AND INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS (Oct. 2009), https://imf.org/ 
external/np/g20/pdf/100109.pdf.  
 33. See INCI ÖTKER-ROBE ET AL., MONETARY AND CAPITAL MKTS. DEP’T, 
THE TOO-IMPORTANT-TO-FAIL CONUNDRUM: IMPOSSIBLE TO IGNORE AND DIFFI-
CULT TO RESOLVE, SDN/11/12 fig. 3 (May 27, 2011), https://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1112.pdf (showing that “institutions that were 
more interconnected appear to have had a higher likelihood of distress” while 
“frequency of distress for very large institutions was only marginally higher 
than for smaller institutions”). 
 34. See, e.g., id. at app. 1 (reviewing available evidence on the economies of 
scale). 
 35. See, e.g., Arnoud W. A. Boot, The Future of Banking: From Scale and 
Scope Economies to Fintech, 2 EUR. ECON. BANKS, REG., & REAL SECTOR 77,  
83–87 (2017), http://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=00ea8c46-b687-4eab-93f5 
-20724c7bb2fd (reviewing research on the economies of scope in finance). 
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The inherently relative, or relational, nature of the “B” fac-
tor in the TBTF formulation further complicates this task. What 
makes a particular firm problematic is not simply that it is “big” 
in some absolute terms but that it is “too big” in terms of the 
macro-economic effects of its failure. In this sense, the “B” factor 
denotes an explicitly systemic, macro-level aspect of the problem. 
All “B” factor determinations involve dynamic assessments of an 
individual entity’s size, market power, or functional significance 
in relation to, and as part of, the financial system as a whole—a 
difficult and context-dependent exercise. 
In sum, what I call here the “B” factor is where the funda-
mental tension within the TBTF metaphor—that between the 
“micro-” and the “macro-” levels of analysis—manifests itself 
most clearly. By broadening the inquiry beyond the discrete 
event of an individual financial firm’s failure, the “B” factor po-
tentially points to the deeper, more structurally significant driv-
ers of the TBTF dynamics. At the same time, it is inherently 
more complex, difficult to define with precision, and thus politi-
cally and normatively contestable. 
II.  IN THE SHADOW OF A HIDDEN PARADOX: POST-
CRISIS SOLUTIONS TO THE TBTF PROBLEM   
Breaking the TBTF concept into two principal compo-
nents—the “F” factor focused on the failure of individual finan-
cial firms, and the “B” factor focused on the size and other indicia 
of such firms’ structural power and functional importance—pro-
vides a helpful framework for assessing the nature and efficacy 
of specific solutions to the TBTF problem. In the first instance, 
it allows for drawing a relatively clear conceptual line between 
two groups of post-crisis TBTF policy responses: the “F” factor 
solutions and the “B” factor solutions, respectively.36 
A. THE “F” FACTOR SOLUTIONS: PRIORITIZING THE “MICRO” 
What I call the “F” factor solutions to the TBTF problem are 
those policies and regulations that explicitly target the firm fail-
ure aspect of the problem.37 Consistent with the heightened sa-
lience of the “F” factor in the TBTF context, this group comprises 
the vast majority of post-crisis regulatory reforms in this area. 
 
 36. Of course, this is only a relatively clear line. As discussed below, various 
post-crisis macroprudential regulatory and supervisory measures attempt to 
mediate, at least in part, the distinction between the “F” and the “B” compo-
nents of the TBTF problem. See infra note 51 and accompanying text; Part II.C. 
 37. It is important to note, however, that there is no officially labeled 
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As a general matter, all currently adopted (or seriously dis-
cussed) “F” factor solutions to the TBTF problem fall into one, or 
both, of the two related categories. They seek either (1) to mini-
mize individual financial firms’ chances of failing (the “don’t let 
them get too risky” approach); or (2) to minimize the broader fall-
out from individual firms’ failure (the “let them fail without 
bringing down the system and thus necessitating bailout” ap-
proach). While a detailed analysis of all post-crisis reforms is be-
yond the scope of this discussion, a brief summary of the relevant 
regulatory changes helps to illustrate the point. 
1. Capital and Liquidity Regulation; Stress Tests 
The first category of the “F” factor solutions includes a wide 
variety of familiar microprudential regulatory tools—such as, 
e.g., capital adequacy ratios, liquidity requirements, consoli-
dated oversight—strengthened and repurposed as post-crisis 
tools of macroprudential regulation and supervision.38 
Capital regulation is the central element in this regime. Its 
purpose is to limit individual banks’ and BHCs’ leverage, pri-
marily by mandating that they continuously meet certain man-
datory ratios of loss-absorbing “regulatory capital” to assets.39 
The modern system of so-called “risk-based” capital regulation 
emerged in 1988, when the Basel Committee on Bank Supervi-
sion (BCBS) published the first common set of risk-based capital 
standards—known as Basel I—agreed upon by regulators from 
 
“TBTF policy” or “TBTF regulatory regime.” Reflecting the all-encompassing 
nature of the TBTF metaphor, these terms are used in public discourse to denote 
an entire complex of regulatory policies that seek to address various aspects of 
the problem. 
 38. On macroprudential regulation generally, see Gabriele Galati & Rich-
hild Moessner, Macroprudential PolicyA Literature Review, 27 J. ECON. SUR-
VEYS 846 (2013) (providing an overview of research); Robert Hockett, The Macro-
prudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and Soundness’ to Systematic 
‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2015) 
(discussing new challenges for combined micro- and macroprudential finance-
regulatory regimes); Macroprudential Policy: An Organizing Framework, IMF 
(Mar. 2011), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/031411.pdf. For an 
early articulation of the importance of macro- approach to regulation, see Fixer-
Upper, infra note 97. 
 39. For an overview of bank capital regulation, see MICHAEL S. BARR, HOW-
ELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND 
POLICY 291–311 (2d ed. 2018) (describing the basic elements of the Basel frame-
work for bank capital requirements); RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. 
MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 238–67 
(6th ed. 2017) (discussing the design and operation of bank capital regulation). 
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the leading industrialized countries.40 In the years leading up to 
the financial crisis, however, Basel I came under intense criti-
cism for being too blunt and not sufficiently sensitive to the ac-
tual risk of banking firms’ assets. In 2004, the BCBS published 
a revised capital accord, Basel II, which effectively allowed large 
financial institutions’ to determine their own risk-based capital 
requirements.41 As became clear in the fall of 2008, this “tai-
lored” and “risk-sensitive” approach led to a dangerous decline 
in the levels of loss-absorbing capital across the banking sector 
and correspondingly excessive accumulation of leverage and risk 
in the financial system.42 
In 2010, the BCBS adopted Basel III, which, among other 
things, significantly tightened the scope and definition of “regu-
latory capital” in order to enhance its loss-absorbing capacity; 
imposed more stringent and varied risk-based capital require-
ments (including certain additional “buffers” and “surcharges” 
on top of the core ratios); and introduced a new, non-risk-based 
“leverage ratio” requirement.43 These changes generally sought 
to strengthen banking institutions’ safety and soundness by forc-
ing them to maintain a more effective balance-sheet cushion 
against sudden losses of their assets’ value.44 
In addition to these traditional solvency-enhancing 
measures, Basel III also includes new liquidity requirements: a 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and a Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR).45 The LCR seeks to ensure the short-term resilience of 
individual banking institutions by mandating that they main-
tain a sufficient stock of “high-quality liquid assets” (HQLA), 
which they can easily convert into cash in private markets to 
 
 40. For a brief history of Basel I Accord, see BARR ET AL., supra note 39, at 
291–95. 
 41. See id. at 296–306. 
 42. See id. at 306–11. By way of clarification, Basel II merely formalized 
and exemplified the generally permissive regulatory approach to bank capital—
and, more broadly, safety and soundness—in the pre-crisis era. Thus, the fateful 
erosion of U.S. banks’ loss-absorbing capacity happened despite the significant 
delays in the U.S. implementation of Basel II.  
 43. For an official summary table of Basel III requirements, see COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION REFORMS, BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3_bank_sup_reforms.pdf.  
 44. In the U.S., the new Basel III requirements were adopted into regula-
tion by 2014. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, 217, 225 (2018); see also, Basel Regulatory 
Framework, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www 
.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/basel/USImplementation.htm (last updated 
Mar. 5, 2017).  
 45. For an overview of Basel III liquidity standards, see BARR ET AL., supra 
note 39, at 327–29. 
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meet all of their liquidity needs for thirty calendar days.46 The 
NSFR, in turn, seeks to limit banking institutions’ reliance on 
short-term wholesale funding that can quickly dry up under 
market stress conditions.47 Specifically, it requires banks to have 
stable funding to meet net outflows in a stressed environment 
for a full year.48 Thus, both LCR and NSFR explicitly aim to im-
prove banks’ ability to withstand market-wide shocks. 
Post-crisis introduction of mandatory stress tests, in turn, 
aims to ensure that individual financial institutions are, in fact, 
sufficiently resilient to shocks and, therefore, more likely to 
avoid failure. In the U.S., for example, the Federal Reserve con-
ducts annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review 
(CCAR) of the largest BHCs, which test their capital planning 
and positions under various severely adverse economic scenar-
ios.49 In addition, certain large BHCs are also required to con-
duct periodic internal stress tests.50 
It is worth noting here that, in a certain sense, the post-cri-
sis regime of enhanced prudential supervision may be viewed as 
an attempt to synthesize, albeit in a partial and indirect manner, 
the entity-level and the system-level factors in addressing the 
TBTF problem.51 This regime seeks to prevent individual firms’ 
 
 46. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY 
AND COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS 1 (Jan. 2013), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm.  
 47. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE NET STA-
BLE FUNDING RATIO 1–2 (Oct. 2013), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Stress Tests and Capital Planning, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/ccar.htm (last updated Feb. 6, 
2019). The Federal Reserve’s CCAR includes as one of its components the su-
pervisory stress tests of the largest BHCs mandated by Section 165(i)(1) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(1) (2012). 
 50. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(2).  
 51. See infra Part II.C. THE “MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END TOO BIG TO FAIL,” 
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in December 2017, pro-
vides a clear example of a deliberate effort to reorient some of the traditional 
“F” factor solutions toward the “B” aspects of the TBTF problem. See THE MIN-
NEAPOLIS PLAN, supra note 12. Thus, THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN advocates using 
significantly heightened capital requirements (up to 38% of the firm’s total con-
solidated assets) as the lever for forcing large banking institutions to reduce, on 
their own, the size of their balance sheets and their systemic significance. Id. at 
4. Not surprisingly, THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN was quickly labeled as too radical 
to be adopted into policy, at least in the foreseeable future. See Jeff Cox, Minne-
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failure as a threat to systemic stability—and adopts firms’ “big-
ness” as the key metric for gauging that threat. Thus, enhanced 
prudential standards apply to financial institutions on a consol-
idated basis.52 Their applicability and the degree of burdensome-
ness also explicitly depend on individual firms’ asset size. Under 
the original text of the Dodd-Frank Act, enhanced prudential 
standards applied to BHCs with over $50 billion in total assets.53 
In 2018, Congress raised this baseline threshold to $250 billion 
and further conditioned the applicability of various specific pro-
visions of the Act on BHCs exceeding specified size thresholds.54 
Tellingly, however, this push for loosening prudential standards 
applicable to smaller institutions is driven by a fundamentally 
micro-level rationale: the belief that “the character of regulation 
should match the character of a firm.”55 
2. Resolution Plans; Orderly Liquidation Authority 
A related but conceptually distinct group of “F” factor solu-
tions to the TBTF problem targets the resolvability of large fi-
nancial institutions. The core idea here is simple: if, despite reg-
ulatory limitations on its risk-taking, a large financial firm 
nevertheless fails, its failure should be contained and managed 
in a way that ensures uninterrupted functioning of the rest of 
the financial system. In other words, the goal is to minimize, if 
not eliminate, the likelihood of government-funded bailouts of 
private financial firms. 
To this end, the Dodd-Frank Act requires all SIFIs and 
BHCs with at least $250 billion in total consolidated assets to 
 
 52. This principle is at the core of the post-crisis concept of SIFI supervi-
sion. 
 53. The original text of the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No, 111-203, as enacted 
on July 21, 2010, is available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW 
-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf. A brief legislative history of the Dodd-
Frank Act is available at Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Act: A Brief Legislative History with Links, Reports, and Sum-
maries, LAW LIBRARIANS SOC’Y OF WASH., D.C., https://www.llsdc.org/dodd 
-frank-legislative-history (last updated Oct. 13, 2017).  
 54. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-174 (2018). 
 55. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement on 
Proposals to Modify Enhanced Prudential Standards for Large Banking Organ-
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prepare and submit to regulators credible resolutions plans, or 
“living wills.”56 
These plans must contain detailed information about the 
firms’ structure and operations and lay out how they would be 
resolved in an orderly and timely manner under various failure 
scenarios.57 Failure to submit a credible resolution plan triggers 
regulatory action, including imposition of more stringent capital 
or liquidity requirements and restrictions on activities or acqui-
sitions.58 
Furthermore, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act established the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), a special resolution re-
gime for financial firms whose failure would have “serious ad-
verse effects on financial stability.”59 The OLA is generally mod-
eled on the traditional bank resolution regime.60 Although the 
statute establishes a multi-agency procedure for initiating the 
OLA proceedings, the FDIC manages the process and exercises 
receivership powers similar in scope to its bank receivership 
powers.61 This includes, among other things, the power to create 
and operate a bridge company if necessary to ensure the conti-
nuity of operations critical to the economy.62 This so-called “Sin-
gle Point of Entry” (SPOE) approach allows the failed firm’s 
functional subsidiaries—banks, broker-dealers, etc.—to operate 
as usual, while the recapitalization takes place at the level of the 
parent holding company.63  
To facilitate SPOE resolutions, the Federal Reserve promul-
gated rules requiring all G-SIBs64—a handful of the largest, 
 
 56. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (2012).  
 57. See generally 12 C.F.R. pt. 243 (2018) (listing requirements for resolu-
tion plans). 
 58. 12 C.F.R § 243.6. 
 59. 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b). 
 60. For an overview of OLA, see BARR ET AL., supra note 39, at 991–96. 
 61. See id.; LABONTE, supra note 4, at 29 (discussing the FDIC’s receiver-
ship powers under the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 62. BARR ET AL., supra note 39, at 991–96. 
 63. See FDIC, Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: 
The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614 (Dec. 18, 2013), https:// 
www.fdic.gov/news/board/2013/2013-12-10_notice_dis-b_fr.pdf. 
 64. The international Financial Stability Board regularly designates cer-
tain financial institutions as “global systemically important banks,” or G-SIBs, 
using a specially designed assessment methodology. The 2018 list of G-SIBs in-
cluded eight U.S. BHCs. See 2018 List of Global Systemically Important Banks 
(G-SIBs), FIN. STABILITY BOARD (Nov. 16, 2018), http://www.fsb.org/2018/11/ 
2018-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-g-sibs (listing JP Morgan 
Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, Bank of New 
York Mellon, Morgan Stanley, and State Street). 
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globally significant U.S. financial institutions—to meet certain 
“total loss-absorbing capacity” (TLAC) requirements through eq-
uity and long-term debt at the level of the ultimate parent com-
pany.65 The TLAC requirements seek to take advantage of struc-
tural subordination of the parent company’s debt to mitigate the 
risk of a run at the level of the operating subsidiaries. Accord-
ingly, the “bail-in” of the failed parent company’s TLAC creditors 
is envisioned as a practical alternative to a publicly funded 
bailout.66 
B. THE “B” FACTOR SOLUTIONS: STRUGGLING WITH THE 
“MACRO” 
The “B” factor solutions to the TBTF problem are those pol-
icies and regulations that explicitly address the “bigness” aspect 
of the problem.67 Consistent with the muted salience of the “B” 
factor in the TBTF context, only a small number of post-crisis 
regulatory reforms are in this group. These reforms, moreover, 
tend to be highly controversial and difficult to implement. 
The “B” factor solutions generally fall into two categories: 
(1) regulatory measures that directly target financial firms’ bal-
ance-sheet size; and (2) structural reforms that inhibit the 
growth and reduce systemic significance of TBTF firms by sub-
jecting them to various activity-based limitations.68 
1. Size Limits 
Direct limits on financial firms’ size—a traditional antitrust 
tool—are both the most obvious and the least common type of a 
“B” factor solution. As a practical matter, size limits are relevant 
only in the context of regulatory approvals of mergers. Thus, Sec-
tion 622 of the Dodd-Frank Act generally prohibits mergers and 
acquisitions if they would result in a firm with total liabilities 
exceeding ten percent of the total liabilities of all financial 
firms.69 Importantly, however, these concentration limits do not 
limit or preclude financial institutions’ “organic” growth not in-
volving outside acquisitions.70 
 
 65. 12 C.F.R. pt. 252 (2018). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See supra Part I. 
 68. The following discussion focuses on the currently existing regulations 
and does not examine any proposed reforms that, if adopted, would fall into the 
“B” factor category. 
 69. 12 U.S.C. § 1852(b) (2012). 
 70. Id. 
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Another potential source of size limits is Section 121 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which gives the Federal Reserve authority to 
require any BHC with at least $250 billion in assets to terminate 
any activities and to sell any assets, if such a BHC poses “a grave 
threat to the financial stability of the United States.”71 The ex-
ercise of this authority, however, is subject to stringent proce-
dural requirements and reserved for extraordinary situations: 
the Federal Reserve cannot order divestment of a firm’s assets 
based simply on its “bigness.”72 To date, the Federal Reserve has 
not exercised this power in practice.73 
2. Activity-Based Limits 
“Structural reform” is a broad term for measures that limit 
the universe of legally permissible activities and investments of 
certain financial firms—mainly, publicly insured deposit-taking 
institutions. In many ways, structural reform constitutes a 
deeper, more explicitly system-oriented form of macroprudential 
regulation.74 It is also the most politically salient and controver-
sial such form. 
In Europe, the trauma of the latest financial crisis has led 
to a serious effort to reconsider the traditionally prevalent “uni-
versal banking” form of organization in the European financial 
sector. In the post-crisis era, several jurisdictions, including the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, France, and the European 
 
 71. Id. § 5331(a). 
 72. Id. (imposing procedural requirements on the Federal Reserve’s ability 
to take action). 
  73.   It is worth noting that another potentially available legal basis for 
breaking up large FHCs is Section 4(m) of the BHC Act, which allows the Fed-
eral Reserve to order any FHC not able to meet the supervisory standards for 
being “well-capitalized and well-managed” to divest its non-banking subsidiar-
ies. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m). Although the Federal Reserve has not yet used this 
authority in practice, it can potentially serve to effect important structural 
changes in the financial industry. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Kress, Solving Banking’s 
‘Too Big To Manage’ Problem, 104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing 
that Section 4(m) of the BHC Act offers the most effective method of breaking 
up large banking entities). The present discussion, however, does not focus on 
Section 4(m) of the BHC Act. Conceptually, Section 4(m) targets not the size of 
any particular entity but its legal status as an FHC, which determines the scope 
of its permissible business activities. Moreover, the Federal Reserve’s Section 
4(m) power to order downsizing of a particular entity depends not on any size-
related factors but on (notoriously fluid) supervisory assessments of each en-
tity’s capital adequacy and management quality.  
 74. For a detailed discussion, see Saule T. Omarova, Central Banks, Sys-
temic Risk, and Financial Sector Structural Reform, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON CENTRAL BANKING 487 (Peter Conti-Brown & Rosa María Lastra eds., 2018) 
[hereinafter Structural Reform]. 
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Union, sought to address their newly salient TBTF problem by 
introducing some form of intra-firm structural separation be-
tween publicly insured deposit-taking activities and the rest of 
financial services performed by universal banks.75 In the United 
Kingdom, this structural reform took form of “ring-fencing” tra-
ditional banks’ “core activities”—retail deposit-taking and pay-
ments, small business lending, etc.—in separately capitalized 
and managed entities, which were expressly prohibited from en-
gaging in proprietary trading and other risky financial activi-
ties.76 The stated purpose of this approach was twofold: (1) to 
shield vital retail banking services from external financial 
shocks (i.e., to minimize contagion); and (2) to make large finan-
cial institutions easier to resolve in the event of failure.77 
 The EU Commission pursued a similar strategy of “subsid-
iarization,” initially laid out in the Liikanen Report and later 
formulated (in a revised form) in the EU Commission’s proposed 
regulation.78 The Commission’s proposal, however, invited in-
tense controversy and was ultimately withdrawn.79 
The principal piece of post-crisis structural reform in the 
United States is the so-called “Volcker Rule,” named after the 
former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker.80 It refers 
to Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which prohibits federally-
insured banks and their affiliates—or “banking entities”—from 
(1) conducting short-term proprietary trading in financial in-
struments (including securities and derivatives); and (2) invest-
ing in or sponsoring certain “covered funds” (including, princi-
pally, hedge funds, and private equity funds).81 The original 
impetus behind this provision was to erect a strict structural 
barrier between publicly subsidized banks that offer systemi-
cally critical public utility-type products and services, on the one 
hand, and non-depository financial institutions that trade and 
 
 75. See id. at 492–95 (identifying and discussing three conceptually distinct 
models of financial industry structure: the “universal bank” model, the “holding 
company” model, and the “strict separation” model). 
 76. The U.K. reforms were the brainchild of the Vickers Commission, 
named after Sir John Vickers, a prominent Oxford economist. For an overview 
of the U.K. “ring-fencing” reforms, see id. at 492–93. 
 77. Id. at 493. 
 78. For an overview of the EU’s structural reform efforts, see id. at 494–95. 
 79. See COM, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMIT-
TEE, AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (2017) 650 (Oct. 24, 2017), https:// 
ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/cwp_2018_annex_iv_en.pdf. 
 80. See Structural Reform, supra note 74, at 496–98. 
 81. 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). 
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deal in risky financial assets, on the other.82 As enacted, how-
ever, the Rule’s transformative aspirations are significantly di-
luted by the numerous exclusions and exemptions from its pro-
hibitions.83  
In December 2013, after several years of issuing proposed 
rules and getting thousands of comments, federal bank regula-
tors issued a joint final rule, in which they further defined the 
scope of the statutory prohibitions and exemptions.84 As imple-
mented by the regulators, the Volcker Rule attempts to draw a 
myriad of fine lines between transactions and activities that, de-
spite being economically similar, are either (1) prohibited, (2) 
categorically excluded from the prohibitions, or (3) specifically 
exempt from them.85 This elaborate line drawing, in effect, trans-
lates the statute’s harshly prohibitive main operative provisions 
into a far more porous and fluid regime, whose applicability and 
degree of intrusiveness depend on facts and circumstances sur-
rounding transactions at hand.86 
In June 2018, federal bank regulators proposed further loos-
ening of the Volcker Rule, expressly seeking to limit the applica-
bility of its structural limitations to the largest U.S. financial 
conglomerates.87 The continuing rollback of the Volcker Rule 
raises serious questions about its future impact. 
 
 82. See Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Pro-
prietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools To Address Evolving 
Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515 (2011) (articulating the policy goals and rea-
soning behind the Dodd-Frank Act’s restrictions on banking entities’ proprie-
tary trading). 
 83. For a list of statutory “permitted activities,” see 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d). 
 84. See 12 C.F.R. pts. 44 (OCC), 248 (Federal Reserve), 351 (FDIC), and 17 
C.F.R. pt. 255 (SEC). All subsequent references to the Volcker Rule are to the 
statutory text as interpreted and implemented in the final rule issued by the 
federal regulatory agencies. For a summary of the tortured history of the rule-
making, as well as a detailed analysis of the final rule’s provisions, see U.S. 
Agencies Approve Final Volcker Rule, Detailing Prohibitions and Compliance 
Regimes Applicable to Banking Entities Worldwide, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 
LLP (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.sullcrom.com/Volcker-Rule-01-27-2014/. 
 85. For an overview of these provisions, see Structural Reform, supra note 
74, at 496–98. 
 86. Id. at 496. 
 87. For an overview of the proposed changes, see Nathan S. Brownback & 
V. Gerard Comizio, Significant Revisions of the Volcker Rule, HARV. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 18, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2018/06/18/significant-revisions-of-the-volcker-rule. 
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C. HOW CLEAR IS THE LINE? 
The purpose of the preceding discussion was not to provide 
a detailed analysis of the Volcker Rule or any other specific set 
of post-crisis reforms, but merely to outline the key features that 
explain the underlying differences between what I call the “B” 
factor solutions and the “F” factor solutions to the TBTF prob-
lem. Even a brief discussion of these ongoing reforms, however, 
is illuminating. 
Thus, it is clear that, compared to the “B” factor solutions, 
the “F” factor solutions occupy a far more prominent position in 
the evolving post-crisis regime of macroprudential regulation 
and supervision. Failure of a large financial firm seems to pro-
vide a much more easily graspable analytic focus for the TBTF 
policy-making. The range of regulatory and supervisory tools de-
signed to reduce the chances of a systemically important finan-
cial institution’s failure and bailout is fairly wide and varied. As 
the existing methods of identifying and monitoring the key indi-
cators of systemic importance are growing increasingly sophisti-
cated, policy-makers and regulators seek to apply these tools in 
a more tailored and risk-sensitive manner. 
Yet, despite all of this conceptual and operational refine-
ment, the size of individual financial institutions’ balance sheets 
—their “bigness” in its simplest form—remains a critical deter-
minant of the nature and intensity of the appropriately tailored 
prudential oversight.88 It is no coincidence, for example, that the 
post-crisis regime of enhanced prudential supervision applies 
only to BHCs above a certain asset size, which now stands at 
$250 billion.89 Recent legislative and regulatory efforts to roll 
back various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, moreover, are 
framed explicitly by reference to easing compliance burden of 
“small” and “medium-sized” financial institutions.90 In an im-
portant sense, the “B” factor provides conceptual scaffolding that 
quietly supports the rich array of “F” factor solutions to the 
TBTF problem. 
In fact, the post-crisis regime of enhanced prudential super-
vision of large BHCs and SIFIs, discussed above, may be viewed 
as a partial attempt to mediate the conceptual distinction be-
tween the “F” and the “B” aspects of the TBTF problem.91 Thus, 
 
 88. See supra Part II.A. 
 89. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 90. Id.; see also supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 91. See supra Part II.A. 
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the currently evolving macroprudential approach fully embraces 
the notion that the source of the problem is the capacity of a sin-
gle firm (“micro”) to generate undesirable systemic effects 
(“macro”)—but takes the view that this capacity can be con-
trolled and diminished without necessarily shrinking or dismem-
bering the firm.92 
The “B” factor solutions, in turn, display a different, albeit 
similarly revealing, internal tension. As described above, policies 
in this category much more explicitly aim to effect structural 
changes in the financial sector and, at least in that sense, are 
inherently systemically oriented. These policies target firms’ size 
and activities in a more intrusive manner, by directly capping 
their liabilities or determining the composition of their assets. 
While “F” factor solutions generally aim to shape financial firms’ 
economic incentives to better align them with the public interest, 
“B” factor solutions operate by directly redrawing the key legal 
and economic boundaries within financial markets. The blunt-
ness and potentially high-impact character of this type of regu-
latory intervention render “B” factor solutions inherently more 
politically salient and controversial than “F” factor solutions. 
Yet, despite these differences, post-crisis “B” factor solutions 
are often framed simply as a variation on the familiar “F” factor 
ones. Policymakers and regulators routinely justify size limits or 
activity restrictions as measures targeting the resilience and re-
solvability of TBTF firms, rather than their “bigness” or struc-
tural market power.93 In this sense, the predominantly macro-
level “B” factor approach seeks to replicate, and continues to ex-
ist within, the primarily micro-level “F” factor discourse. This 
consciously self-limiting interpretation has significant practical 
implications: it leaves the full potential of the financial sector 
structural reform largely untapped. 
 
 92. Even THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN does not advocate mandatory size limits 
or activity-based breakups of large banking firms, relying instead on capital re-
quirements to incentivize such firms to reduce their size and systemic im-
portance voluntarily. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Moreover, the 
proposal’s general framing retains its conceptual focus on the need to minimize 
the likelihood and public costs of bank bailouts—the quintessential feature of 
the “F” factor approach. See THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN, supra note 12, at 42 (ex-
plaining that adoption of THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN would “lead banks to restruc-
ture themselves” so as to eliminate the need for bank bailouts in the future). 
 93. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. Presumably, this nor-
mative framing reflects policymakers’ and regulators’ desire to downplay the 
politically contestable aspects of structural reforms. 
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Importantly, this discursive triumph of “micro” over 
“macro,” entity-centric over systemic perspectives creates an ap-
pearance of normative and conceptual coherence in the current 
approaches to the TBTF problem. It accordingly makes the fun-
damental paradox embedded in the TBTF metaphor more diffi-
cult to see and appreciate. The tensions re-emerge, however, as 
TBTF policies come under pressure in the process of their imple-
mentation. 
III.  FACING THE PARADOX: TBTF IN A SYSTEMIC 
CONTEXT   
As discussed above, the bulk of post-crisis solutions to the 
TBTF problem operate mainly on a micro-level and target pri-
marily individual financial institutions’ balance sheets.94 While 
the overall orientation and rhetoric of post-crisis financial regu-
lation are self-consciously macro-prudential, most regulatory 
tools are still fundamentally geared toward identifying, monitor-
ing, and influencing individual firms’ economic choices.95 An un-
spoken assumption behind much of regulatory action in this 
realm is that fortifying individual financial firms’ balance sheets 
—that is, making them both less prone to failure and easier to 
resolve if they nevertheless fail—will more or less automatically 
translate into a stronger, more resilient financial system.96 
This common fallacy of composition becomes difficult to ig-
nore, however, when one widens the lens beyond a single entity’s 
balance sheet—or even many individual entities’ balance 
sheets—and examines the efficacy of TBTF solutions in the con-
text of the broader systemic dynamics.97 This shift in perspective 
exposes certain important vulnerabilities built into the current 
regulatory approaches. It also sheds light on potential ways to 
 
 94. See supra Part II.A. (explaining how the post-crisis regulatory reform 
process prioritized micro-level solutions to the TBTF problem). 
 95. See supra Part II.A,C. 
 96. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 97. For more on this underlying “fallacy of composition” in financial regu-
lation, see Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 
(2010) [hereinafter Fixer-Upper]; Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: A Con-
structive Retrieval for Sustainable Finance, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
401 (2013) [hereinafter Bretton Woods 1.0]; Robert Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and 
Blame? 17–18 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11–09, 
2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1805930; Saule T. 
Omarova, Ethical Finance as a Systemic Challenge: Risk, Culture, and Struc-
ture, 27 CORNELL J.L. & POL’Y 797, 825–27 (2018). 
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strengthen or supplement such approaches in order to address 
the TBTF problem more effectively.98  
A. SYSTEMIC DYNAMICS AND VULNERABILITY OF CURRENT 
SOLUTIONS 
Perhaps the most significant truly systemic factor, explicitly 
and prominently incorporated in the existing TBTF policy, is 
markets’ susceptibility to risk contagion. Many regulatory and 
supervisory requirements expressly seek to minimize or elimi-
nate the risk of one firm’s failure spreading throughout the sys-
tem, via direct counterparty exposures, asset “fire sales,” or oth-
erwise.99 Both the “F” and the “B” factor solutions to the TBTF 
problem, discussed above, are more or less directly concerned 
with minimizing contagion and containing the damage from any 
large financial firm’s failure.100 
Despite its obvious importance, however, contagion is not 
the only relevant systemic factor in the TBTF context. In today’s 
interconnected and fast-moving financial universe, each individ-
ual firm’s risk profile is invariably dependent upon a wide vari-
ety of system-wide trends and relational dynamics. Incorporat-
ing these dynamics into analyses of firms’ resilience is, therefore, 
both necessary and complicated. To put it simply, what seems 
perfectly workable in the context of a single balance sheet, con-
sidered in isolation, may or may not produce intended results 
when the entity actually interacts with the outside world. 
A few examples help to illustrate how certain core systemic 
dynamics shape the efficacy of the traditional TBTF solutions. 
1. Complexity and Arbitrage 
It is a well-known fact that today’s financial system is grow-
ing increasingly complex and difficult to manage. This overarch-
ing trend manifests itself not only in the dazzling organizational 
 
 98. See infra Part IV (offering a series of alternative approaches to solving 
the TBTF problem in finance). 
 99. In fact, the concept of “systemic risk” in the financial sector is often de-
fined by reference to contagion. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 
GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) (defining systemic risk as “the risk that (i) an economic 
shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or other-
wise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of 
significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost 
of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial finan-
cial-market price volatility”). 
 100. See supra Part II. 
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complexity of large financial conglomerates, but also in the ex-
ponential growth of complex financial instruments—derivatives, 
asset-backed securities, and other structured products—and cor-
respondingly complex markets in which they trade.101 
Derivatives and structured products are notoriously difficult 
to understand and value, even with the help of increasingly so-
phisticated mathematical modeling.102 Functionally, they sepa-
rate and repackage ownership, payment, and other rights and 
obligations associated with previously largely indivisible finan-
cial assets. Institutionally, they trade in globalized, technologi-
cally sophisticated, dealer-run markets that connect myriads of 
institutional actors through an intricate network of direct con-
tractual links and indirect common exposure to risks.103 These 
markets are huge, unpredictable, and fundamentally opaque.104 
Importantly, this complexity, opacity, interconnectedness, 
and fragmentation make it extremely difficult to measure and 
analyze not only the overall pattern of risk distribution in the 
financial system but also the true level of individual financial 
firms’ risk exposure. This is particularly true because the shape-
shifting nature of derivatives and other complex financial instru-
ments enables continuous—and dangerously procyclical—flows 
of risk and leverage across regulatory boundaries.105 The pre-cri-
sis growth of the infamous “shadow banking” sector is a vivid 
example of these dynamics.106 In the post-crisis era, rapid ad-
 
 101. See Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex 
Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 68–84 (2012) [hereinafter License 
to Deal] (explaining the dynamics and systemic consequences of “rapid prolifer-
ation of increasingly complex financial instruments” in today’s markets). 
 102. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of In-
formational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1457, 1463 (1993) (arguing that financial regulators cannot keep up with 
development of complex derivatives). 
 103. See Dan Awrey, The Mechanisms of Derivatives Market Efficiency, 91 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104, 1125–26 (2016). 
 104. See id. at 1124–35 (examining the complex structure of derivatives mar-
kets). 
 105. See MARCUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., INT’L CTR. FOR MONETARY & 
BANKING STUDIES, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULA-
TION; GENEVA REPORTS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY (11th ed. 2009); Charles A. 
E. Goodhart, Financial Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL BANKING, FI-
NANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 326 (Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato 
Masciandaro eds., 2011). For more on market procyclicality, see infra Part 
III.A.3. 
 106. See, e.g., TOBIAS ADRIAN, ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & NICOLA CETORELLI, 
SHADOW BANK MONITORING, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 
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vances in digital technology and computing power—and the in-
creasingly high role of “fintech”—potentially further amplify the 
underlying patterns of hidden accumulation and dispersion of 
risk.107 
These macro-level conditions of market complexity and per-
vasive regulatory arbitrage cast significant doubt on the ability 
of the primarily micro-level TBTF solutions to deliver the desired 
results. As risky activities and exposures of large, diversified fi-
nancial institutions get harder to quantify and contain, keeping 
these institutions from failing and triggering a cascade of losses 
becomes an increasingly system-wide undertaking. This means 
that keeping the principal focus of TBTF regulation on individ-
ual firms’ balance sheets is bound to miss the core market dy-
namics allowing risk move in and out of any individual firm’s 
observable orbit. 
2. Interactions with the Real Economy 
Another crucial systemic aspect that current TBTF solu-
tions tend to ignore is the functional relationship between the 
financial sector and the broader economy. 
The principal object of the current regime of prudential reg-
ulation and supervision of financial institutions is these institu-
tions’ safety and soundness.108 Regulators and supervisors mon-
itor and evaluate the strength of firms’ loss-absorbing capital 
cushions, robustness of their risk underwriting and manage-
ment procedures, and quality of their asset portfolios primarily 
with the eye toward preventing these firms’ failure. However, 
regulators do not second-guess private financial firms’ substan-
tive business decisions in terms of how well they channel capital 
to its most productive uses in the non-financial, or “real,” econ-
omy.109 Although various tax or regulatory incentives may influ-
 
638 (Sept. 2013); TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN, THE SHADOW BANKING 
SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 382 (July 2009); Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Reg-
ulating the Shadow Banking System, 41 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIV-
ITY 261 (2010). 
 107. See Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic 
Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. REG. (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Fintech as a Sys-
temic Phenomenon]. 
 108. See supra Part II.A. (discussing some of the key elements of the post-
crisis regime of prudential regulation and supervision). 
 109. To the extent that there are direct legal and regulatory restrictions on 
the types or concentrations of loans and other assets that banking institutions 
can hold on their balance sheets, these restrictions are designed to ensure 
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ence these decisions, individual financial institutions are gener-
ally free of governmental interference in their credit-allocation 
decisions.110 
In fact, this vesting of substantive control over economy-
wide credit allocation in private actors’ hands is a core element 
of the U.S. paradigm of financial regulation.111 The reason for 
this outsourcing of allocative decisions to private financial firms 
is rooted fundamentally in their presumed informational ad-
vantages and individualized economic incentives. Because pri-
vate market actors are presumably superior decision-makers “on 
the ground,” their judgments on which real-economy projects to 
fund are not to be substituted by those of the regulators.112 
In this paradigm, the public explicitly bears the primary re-
sponsibility for maintaining the appropriate aggregates of credit 
in the economy, or system-wide credit modulation.113 
As explained in detail elsewhere, this division of roles is 
characteristic of the public-private franchise model of finance.114 
This model is inherently unstable: the private franchisees (pri-
vate financial institutions) often abuse their allocative powers in 
pursuit of higher profits.115 The entire regime of government reg-
ulation of financial firms—especially, TBTF firms—is designed 
to guard against this danger and to minimize the obvious moral 
hazard built into this system. 
 
banks’ safety and soundness. While these regulations affect financial flows into 
various segments of the economy, they are not meant to operate as tools of in-
dustrial policy. 
 110. Thus, specific laws and regulations may deliberately incentivize finan-
cial firms to invest in various “preferred” asset classes. This includes, for exam-
ple, allowing banks to calculate their capital ratios using lower risk weights for 
certain residential mortgage loans. This is, however, very different from regu-
lators judging the validity of individual commercial loans extended by any par-
ticular bank on the basis of their broader macro-structural or socio-economic 
impact, rather than by reference to the bank’s own safety and soundness. 
 111. Elsewhere, I refer to this paradigm as the “New Deal settlement in fi-
nance.” See Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, supra note 107. For a deeper 
theoretical account, see Finance Franchise, supra note 24, at 1213 n.250 (noting 
that, while government actors can influence credit allocation, “privately-owned 
financial institutions control who gets access to credit”). 
 112. See Finance Franchise, supra note 24, at 1213 (“The principal justifica-
tion given for this delegation of control over the allocation of financial resources 
to private actors is their putatively superior ability to gather and process vital 
market information at the micro level faster and more efficiently than any one 
agency such as the state is able to do.”). 
 113. Id. at 1213; see also Fixer-Upper, supra note 97 (advocating “regulation 
as modulation”). 
 114. See Finance Franchise, supra note 24, at 1147. 
 115. See id. at 1215. 
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In reality, however, allocation and modulation of credit and 
money in the financial system are intimately connected tasks. 
Systemically destabilizing asset price booms are the direct effect 
of socially suboptimal allocative decisions by individual market 
participants.116 Forgetting or ignoring this fundamental link un-
dermines both the financial system and the real economy. The 
former suffers from excessive speculation and instability, while 
the latter suffers from excessive financialization and erosion of 
productive capacity. Not only does the financial system grow too 
large vis-à-vis the rest of the economy, it also becomes too self-
referential and even predatory. Instead of serving capital needs 
of the productive economic enterprise, it systematically diverts 
financial flows toward socially unproductive financial specula-
tion.117 
Viewed from this perspective, the familiar methods of com-
batting TBTF appear fundamentally incomplete. While focusing 
on the safety and soundness, solvency and liquidity of large fi-
nancial firms, the post-crisis TBTF solutions remain essentially 
agnostic with respect to the macro-level structural effects of 
these firms’ credit allocation decisions. Yet, persistent economy-
wide misallocation of credit is a critical factor in destabilizing 
the financial system and exacerbating the moral hazard built 
into its operation. In this sense, decisively resolving the TBTF 
problem ultimately requires a serious rebalancing of the cur-
rently dysfunctional relationship between the financial system 
and the broader economy. As long as the financial system re-
mains self-referentially speculative and divorced from the real 
economy, the TBTF phenomenon is unlikely to disappear. 
3. Procyclicality and Collective Agency 
A vital attribute of the financial system relevant to the 
TBTF discussion is the pervasive tendency toward procyclicality 
in the operation of financial markets—and the correspondingly 
critical market-stabilizing role of certain “big” market actors. 
On a fundamental level, the term “procyclicality” denotes a 
particularly pernicious form of self-reinforcing, or recursive, col-
lective action problems.118 Generally, collective action problems 
 
 116. Id. at 1214–15. 
 117. Id.; see also National Investment Authority, supra note 24, at 448–58. 
 118. For an in-depth analysis of market procyclicality as a recursive collec-
tive action problem, see Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: 
The Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets, Macroecon-
omies and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. 1, 5 (2015) [hereinafter 
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arise in situations in which the multitude of individually ra-
tional actions ultimately produce a suboptimal—collectively ir-
rational—outcome.119 Financial markets, in particular, are rife 
with collective action problems that have a recursive quality.120 
Financial asset bubbles, fueled by short-term speculation and 
followed by devastating busts, exemplify this phenomenon.121 
While it is individually rational for each firm to purchase assets 
during the bubble phase and sell them during the bust phase, 
these mutually reinforcing, individually rational decisions ag-
gregate into collectively dysfunctional outcomes: i.e., financial 
crises.122 
Avoiding this collective irrationality necessarily requires co-
herent collective agency, exercised counter-cyclically.123 In sim-
ple terms, it requires a different kind of a market actor: one 
whose actions are not constrained by the same dictates of indi-
vidual rationality that make everyone else to pile into the same 
market “bet,” and who is both able and willing to take the oppo-
site side of that collectively irrational bet. This market contrar-
ian role is essential to the stable functioning of the financial mar-
ket: it effectively operates as the internal mechanism of dynamic 
countercyclical self-regulation. 
Importantly, to be effective, the relevant collective agent 
must not only be free of the usual motivational constraints, but 
also possess sufficient resources to withstand the inevitable mar-
ket pressure long enough to generate the desired price correc-
tion. In other words, the collective agent must be “big.” In the 
context of today’s huge and interconnected financial markets, 
that agent must be very big. 
This basic reality casts the familiar TBTF problem in an un-
expected light. It brings to the fore the fact that, to ensure finan-
cial stability, we need to have a certain kind of “big,” economi-
cally powerful, strategically positioned market actor.124 From 
 
Recursive Collective Action Problems]. 
 119. Id. at 3. 
 120. Id. at 1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 17–22; Bretton Woods 1.0, supra note 97, at 420–25. 
 123. Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 118, at 23–32. 
 124. To some extent, the renewed legislative and regulatory emphasis on the 
critical stability-enhancing role of clearinghouses and other “financial market 
utilities” (FMUs)—big, strategically positioned entities acting as collective 
agents in certain market contexts—reflects the post-crisis realization of this 
fundamental fact. It is telling, for example, that Subchapter VIII of the Dodd-
Frank Act deals specifically with systemically important FMUs. See 12 U.S.C. 
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this perspective, “bigness” is not a bug but a necessary institu-
tional feature of the modern financial system. Of course, this fact 
does not invalidate any of the fundamental public policy con-
cerns associated with the TBTF phenomenon—including, in par-
ticular, concerns related to the destabilizing effects of moral haz-
ard.125 It means, however, that a truly effective solution to the 
TBTF problem must incorporate a thoughtful approach to 
strengthening the existing—and creating new—institutional 
forms of counter-cyclical collective agency in today’s large-scale 
and increasingly complex financial markets. 
As a practical matter, only public instrumentalities acting 
directly within financial markets are fully equipped to perform 
this critical function.126 Public instrumentalities’ unique built-in 
advantages—large size, access to public funding, long-term in-
vestment horizon, legal and regulatory privileges—enable them 
to take on greater risk at times when no private market actor is 
able to do so.127 Public instrumentalities are the true “natural” 
market contrarians whose presence is critical in order to resolve 
financial markets’ dysfunctional tendency toward procyclicality. 
Even the biggest private firms are inherently incapable of per-
forming this role reliably and consistently.128 
This analysis helps to reframe the “bigness” element of the 
TBTF metaphor not simply as an issue of individual firms’ size 
or interconnectedness, but as a much broader issue of the rela-
tive roles and competencies of the public and private actors in 
the financial system. It also highlights the deeper sense in which 
TBTF is ultimately a problem of the public-private balance in 
finance. Focusing on individual private firms’ balance sheets or 
other characteristics is simply too narrow an approach to this 
problem. 
 
§ 5461 (2012). However, to the extent that these systemically significant FMUs 
are profit-seeking private entities, their elevated status in the post-crisis era 
raises an additional specter of potentially significant TBTF concerns. See, e.g., 
David Skeel, What If a Clearinghouse Fails?, BROOKINGS (June 6, 2017), https:// 
www.brookings.edu/research/what-if-a-clearinghouse-fails; see also Stephen J. 
Lubben, Failure of the Clearinghouse: Dodd-Frank’s Fatal Flaw? 10 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 127, 128–30 (2015); Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1644–46 (2013). 
 125. See supra Part I.A. 
 126. See Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 118, at 24. 
 127. See Public Actors, supra note 24, at 137–38. 
 128. See id.; see also sources cited supra note 124. 
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B. PARADOX RESURFACES: THE RHETORIC OF “UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES” 
This fundamental inability of the current TBTF solutions to 
incorporate the broader systemic determinants of the TBTF phe-
nomenon comes into sharp relief in the context of the financial 
industry’s efforts to roll back post-crisis regulatory reforms. In 
the United States, these efforts aim primarily at dismantling or 
weakening the principal elements of the Dodd-Frank Act’s re-
gime of macroprudential regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions.129  
Rhetorically, this deregulatory campaign is often framed by 
reference to so-called “unintended consequences” of post-crisis 
regulation.130 However disingenuous or self-interested the in-
dustry’s claims may be, they inadvertently highlight a very real 
underlying weakness of the current regime: the lack of sufficient 
attention to the systemic, macro-level aspects of the TBTF prob-
lem.  
For example, one of the industry’s most commonly used de-
regulatory arguments posits that strict prudential oversight of 
banks and other regulated financial institutions merely pushes 
risky activities into the unregulated “shadow” markets.131 
Therefore, the argument goes, the post-crisis attempts at insti-
tuting such oversight are inherently futile and harmful. 
Regardless of its obviously and deeply flawed logic, this ar-
gument hits at the real point of vulnerability in the current reg-
ulatory philosophy: its systematic bias toward fundamentally 
entity-level solutions. As a result of this bias, most post-crisis 
regulatory reforms do not deal in a sufficiently explicit manner 
with the broader dynamics of risk creation and transfer across 
 
 129. See, e.g., Joint Letter from the Mid-Size Bank Coal. of Am. and the Reg’l 
Bank Coal. to the U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 26, 2017) [hereinafter 
Joint Letter], http://regionalbanks.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/MBCA-RBC 
-Joint-Letter-to-Congress-1-26-17.pdf. 
 130. See, e.g., id. Of course, proponents of greater oversight of the financial 
sector also use the rhetoric of “unintended consequences” to show that various 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, as implemented, failed to deliver the expected 
public benefits. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 124, at 1644–48. The following discus-
sion, however, purposely focuses on the explicitly anti-regulatory or deregula-
tory arguments advanced or supported by the financial industry. These argu-
ments use the rhetoric of “unintended consequences” to roll back many of the 
core post-crisis attempts to eliminate or control the TBTF problem.  
 131. See, e.g., Guillaume Plantin, Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regu-
lation, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 146, 146–47 (2015) (suggesting that regulation of tra-
ditional banking institutions contributes to the growth of shadow banking). 
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the formal entity and sectoral boundaries. Accordingly, most cur-
rent TBTF solutions do not directly foreclose opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage that dilute or distort their intended effect. 
Another reliable—and quite successful—industry argument 
is that the supposedly excessively burdensome and costly post-
crisis regulation unnecessarily constrains availability of credit 
to individuals and small and medium-sized businesses.132 The 
argument is that the higher costs of regulatory compliance—and 
especially the more stringent regulatory capital requirements—
make it prohibitively expensive for banks to make loans to oth-
erwise deserving companies.133 This, in turn, allegedly impedes 
economic growth and job-creation.134 Therefore, the argument 
goes, it is necessary to lift or significantly relax post-crisis regu-
latory constraints on banks’ risk-taking for the sake of the real 
economy and its unimpeded growth.135 
Substantively, this argument is without merit.136 There is 
currently no shortage of capital available for lending in the bank-
ing system, so the real problem is not so much banks’ lending 
capacity as the systematic distortions in their credit allocation 
decisions.137 In the context of the present discussion, however, 
this particular line of deregulatory rhetoric is noteworthy for its 
overt acknowledgment of the fundamental functional link be-
tween finance and the broader economy.138 The industry’s dereg-
ulatory offensive effectively seizes on the fact that the post-crisis 
 
 132. See Joint Letter, supra note 129. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See, e.g., id. (“Many of Dodd-Frank’s provisions sap resources that we 
could instead deploy to extend credit and dynamically serve our communities. 
We face higher operational costs and are forced to divert capital and funding 
away from the products we offer and lending that helps businesses expand and 
create jobs.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies and Irrelevant Facts in the 
Discussion on Capital Regulation, in CENTRAL BANKING AT A CROSSROADS: EU-
ROPE AND BEYOND 33, 34 (Charles Goodhart et al. eds., 2014); Anat Admati & 
Martin Hellwig, The Parade of the Bankers’ New Clothes Continues: 31 Flawed 
Claims Debunked (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2292229 (specifically debunking the claim that increased capital requirements 
reduce bank lending). 
 137. See Fostering Economic Growth: Midsized, Regional and Large Institu-
tion Perspective Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 115th 
Cong. 14 (2017) (written testimony of Saule T. Omarova). The allocative distor-
tion results from the basic fact that it remains far more profitable for banks and 
other financial institutions to channel credit into speculative secondary-market 
trading rather than to fund long-term investments in the real economy. See Na-
tional Investment Authority, supra note 24, at 446–58. 
 138. See Joint Letter, supra note 129. 
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shift to macroprudential oversight is not sufficiently “macro-” in 
its scope.139 As long as this remains the case, it will be difficult 
to rebuke the industry’s attacks on the regulatory regime de-
signed to constrain the growth of TBTF firms. 
A different, more subtle line of arguments against pursuing 
aggressive TBTF policies builds on the financial markets’ need 
for coherent collective agency, exercised counter-cyclically, as a 
vital self-correction mechanism.140 As discussed above, only suf-
ficiently large market participants can perform this critical sta-
bilization role effectively and on the requisite scale: in this sense, 
“big” is not necessarily “bad.”141 This understanding, however, 
can be used to argue that “smart” regulatory reforms should view 
the size of financial mega-firms’ balance sheets not so much as a 
problem—and, in any event, not as the main problem—but more 
as an organic product and an institutional feature of modern fi-
nance.142 Accordingly, instead of seeking to eliminate the TBTF 
problem through overly restrictive regulations, the argument 
goes, we should aim to accommodate and manage the growth and 
activities of large, systemically important market actors.143  
Although this argument is typically framed in technocratic 
terms, it carries a clear normative message: the government 
should not waste its limited resources trying to depress the size 
or market power of individual financial firms—it should “work 
with” these firms to help them perform their socially beneficial 
functions.144 In practical terms, however, this usually means 
asymmetrically expanding the public’s responsibility for backing 
up these firms’ rapidly growing private liabilities and supporting 
the rapidly growing markets in which they trade.145 Recent pro-
posals to formalize and enlarge the scope of the government’s 
role as the provider of “last resort” liquidity and solvency support 
 
 139. See supra Part III.A (arguing that post-crisis regulatory reforms re-
mained fundamentally micro-level in their focus). See also, Miriam F. Weis-
mann et al., The New Macroprudential Reform Paradigm: Can It Work?, 16 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 1029, 1033 (2014) (assessing the post-crisis shift to a macropru-
dential regulatory regime). 
 140. See supra notes 118–24 and accompanying text. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Michael Grunwald, Don’t Break Up the Megabanks, POLITICO: THE 
AGENDA (May 27, 2015), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/05/ 
sanders-dont-break-up-the-big-banks-000054. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Guarantor of Last Resort, 97 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (proposing to formalize the mode of de facto expansion of 
public backup of financial markets during the 2008-2009 crisis). 
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to major dealer-firms and other SIFIs illustrate this trend.146 
They also underscore the deeply political stakes in the TBTF bat-
tle over the public-private balance of power in finance. 
In sum, many of the familiar criticisms of—and arguments 
for reversing—post-crisis regulatory reforms derive their 
strength from playing on various systemic aspects of the TBTF 
problem, which these reforms do not explicitly or effectively ad-
dress. By doing so, these deregulatory and anti-regulatory argu-
ments exploit the hidden tensions within the TBTF concept and 
policy framework.147 
Of course, rolling back post-crisis regulatory reforms is by 
no means the only, or the best, possible response to this reap-
pearance of the TBTF paradox. To the contrary, since the prob-
lem with the current TBTF solutions is their failure to incorpo-
rate certain core macro-level dynamics, the appropriate cure for 
this problem would be to expand and strengthen the structural, 
systemic focus of the TBTF policy toolkit. 
IV.  WHAT NOW? REFRAMING THE PROBLEM, 
REBALANCING SOLUTIONS   
Generally, there are two mutually complementary ap-
proaches to rendering the TBTF policy more effective and re-
sponsive to key systemic dynamics discussed above: (1) to build 
up the arsenal of more comprehensive and assertive “B” factor 
solutions; and (2) to supplement traditional regulatory ap-
proaches to TBTF by directly targeting specific dysfunctions in 
the operation of financial markets. 
A. REINFORCING EXISTING TOOLS: SIZE CAPS; STRUCTURAL 
SEPARATION 
A good starting point for rebalancing post-crisis TBTF poli-
cies would be to expand the range and potential impact of the 
“B” factor solutions, discussed above.148 The “B” factor, with its 
 
 146. See, e.g., id. See generally PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD 
STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT (2011) (discussing 
the increased scope of the Federal Reserve’s traditional “lender of last resort” 
role); HAL S. SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FI-
NANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS (2016) (proposing to expand the government’s 
role as the direct guarantor of privately-traded financial liabilities). 
 147. See supra Part II.C. 
 148. See supra Part II.B (identifying and discussing post-crisis “B” factor so-
lutions). 
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more organic focus on the structural drivers of the TBTF prob-
lem, deserves greater prominence in how we understand and 
mitigate that problem in the interconnected and complex world 
of modern finance.149 
The most readily available choice in this respect is to start 
using the existing regulatory and supervisory tools more asser-
tively and consistently—and for the explicit purpose of shaping 
the broad structural dynamics in the financial sector. For exam-
ple, the Federal Reserve could begin exercising its broad statu-
tory powers to reduce the balance sheet size and to limit the 
scope of activities of any BHC with assets above the $250-billion 
threshold that poses “a grave threat to the financial stability of 
the United States[.]”150 Pursuant to this authority, the Federal 
Reserve can order these large financial institutions to terminate 
any activity, divest any assets, or freeze any acquisition plans.151 
Although the exercise of this authority by the Federal Reserve is 
explicitly conditioned on the requisite “grave threat” determina-
tion, it nevertheless represents a potentially powerful tool for 
breaking up TBTF mega-firms. A similarly potent tool that fed-
eral bank regulators could start utilizing is their legal authority 
to order significant asset divestitures and other restructuring by 
large financial institutions that repeatedly failed to submit cred-
ible “living wills,” discussed above.152 
Of course, the key challenge for the Federal Reserve and 
other regulators is to signal to the market their resolve to use 
these extraordinary tools in the appropriate circumstances—and 
be ready to follow through with this threat in practice. This is a 
difficult commitment to make credibly, especially in light of fed-
eral bank regulators’ traditional distaste for taking public en-
forcement actions—and the financial industry’s traditional pro-
pensity to fight such inherently complex determinations in 
courts. 
 
 149. It should be emphasized here that all of the explicitly systemically ori-
ented, structural solutions discussed below should supplement, rather than re-
place, the current regime of entity-based regulation and supervision. It is cru-
cial to address the TBTF problem on the micro-level and the macro-level as part 
of a unified and dynamic strategy. For a recent defense of entity-based pruden-
tial oversight of non-bank SIFIs, see Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & 
Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities and Activities: Complementary Ap-
proaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 150. 12 U.S.C. § 5331 (2012). For an earlier discussion of Section 121 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act that created this authority, see supra note 71 and accompany-
ing text. 
 151. 12 U.S.C. § 5331.  
 152. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
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To target the “B” factor in the TBTF problem more consist-
ently and directly, Congress could extend the regulators’ author-
ity to break up TBTF firms by simply mandating such restruc-
turing whenever any firm reaches some specified size threshold. 
Several academic and legislative proposals have advanced this 
TBTF-focused variation on the traditional antitrust approach.153 
For example, in October 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders intro-
duced a bill aptly entitled “Too Big To Fail, Too Big To Exist,” 
which would cap the size of the largest financial institutions so 
that any single company’s total exposure would not exceed three 
percent of the country’s GDP.154 
In addition to, or in lieu of, these antitrust-type measures, 
policymakers and regulators could also pursue a range of 
broader structural reforms aiming to control the growth of TBTF 
firms by restricting their permissible business activities. In fact, 
one of the fundamental tenets of the U.S. system of banking laws 
and regulations is the principle of separation of banking from 
commerce, which seeks to keep deposit-taking institutions struc-
turally separate from non-financial, commercial companies.155 
Thus, U.S. commercial banks generally cannot conduct any ac-
tivities that fall outside the statutory concept of “the business of 
banking.”156 Moreover, under the BHC Act, companies that own 
or “control” U.S. banks—i.e., U.S. BHCs—are generally re-
stricted in their ability to engage in any business activities other 
 
 153. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET 
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 208–10 (2010) (discussing 
why limiting the size of financial institutions is beneficial to the economy); Jon-
athan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1372 (2011) 
(advocating for a regulatory regime that “would require the largest financial 
institutions to choose between downsizing themselves in order to comply with 
the size rule or acquiescing to a government-mandated breakup plan”). 
 154. Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Exist, S. 3542, 115th Cong. (2018). At the 
time of its unveiling, the bill’s proposed size cap equaled about $584 billion, 
which would have resulted in the breakup of six largest U.S. BHCs. Sanders, 
Sherman Introduce Legislation to Break Up Too Big to Fail Financial Institu-
tions, BERNIE SANDERS: U.S. SENATOR FOR VT. (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www 
.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/sanders-sherman-introduce 
-legislation-to-break-up-too-big-to-fail-financial-institutions. 
 155. Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives 
Changed the “Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1048–49 (2009) 
[hereinafter The Quiet Metamorphosis]. 
 156. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2012). 
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than banking, managing banks, or certain activities “closely re-
lated” to banking.157 
Since the 1980s, the scope of banks’ and BHCs’ permissible 
activities has been steadily and gradually expanding.158 Most no-
tably, in 1999, Congress authorized certain qualifying BHCs to 
become “financial holding companies” (FHCs) and to conduct a 
wide range of financial and even some commercial activities.159 
One obvious consequence of this activity expansion was a dra-
matic consolidation of market power in the small number of 
mega-sized financial conglomerates.160 Another, perhaps less ob-
vious, systemic consequence was a qualitative increase in the na-
ture and degree of fragility-inducing interconnectedness and 
complexity in the financial sector.161 Among other things, the re-
moval of the Glass-Steagall era prohibitions on cross-affiliations 
created unprecedented opportunities for undetected leakages of 
the public subsidy from insured banks to their non-bank affili-
ates engaged in high-risk dealing and trading operations.162 This 
direct amplification of the TBTF problem is especially pro-
nounced in the context of large U.S. banking institutions ex-
panding into purely commercial activities that themselves have 
 
 157. Id. §§ 1841–43. In essence, the BHC Act is an antitrust legislation tai-
lored to the unique public significance and vulnerabilities of the modern bank-
ing system. 
 158. See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Com-
merce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 279 (2013) [hereinafter Mer-
chants of Wall Street] (analyzing the dramatic expansion of banking entities’ 
energy and commodity trading activities since 1999); The Quiet Metamorphosis, 
supra note 155, at 1044 (showing how the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency gradually enabled national banks to engage in a wide range of derivatives 
trading activities). 
 159. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k); see also Merchants of Wall Street, supra note 158 
at 279–80 (arguing that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 “enabled FHCs to 
engage in commercial activities on a much broader scale than before”); The 
Quiet Metamorphosis, supra note 155, at 1093 (clarifying that FHCs are allowed 
to engage in a wide range of purely commercial activities, subject to specific 
legislative and regulatory conditions). 
 160. See Dafna Avraham et al., A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding 
Companies, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 65, 66 (2012) (showing the top BHCs hold 
over eighty percent of the industry’s total assets). 
 161. Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Un-
fulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1683, 
1775 (2011) (emphasizing the new sources of systemic risk rooted in the “global 
interconnectedness of today’s financial markets”). 
 162. For a detailed analysis of these important intra-FHC dynamics, and 
their systemic stability implications, see id. at 1706–63. 
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a heightened systemic significance, such as trading in key phys-
ical commodities and energy.163 
These developments notwithstanding, however, U.S. banks’ 
and BHCs’ activities, investments, and organizational affilia-
tions remain subject to significant limitations. In this sense, the 
existing regime of separating banking from commerce provides 
a natural platform for federal regulators to maintain and rein-
force—rather than weaken or eliminate—certain key structural 
boundaries in the financial system.164 
In the post-crisis era, there have been several attempts to 
legislate further structural separations between depository in-
stitutions and other financial market intermediaries. Thus, in 
July 2013, a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators, led by Elizabeth 
Warren and John McCain, introduced a bill entitled the “21st 
Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2013.”165 The proposed bill sought 
to (1) prohibit federally insured deposit-taking institutions from 
affiliating or having interlocking management with securities 
firms, insurance companies, and derivatives dealers; and (2) 
tighten the scope of banks’ permissible activities, among other 
things, by prohibiting investments in structured or synthetic 
products.166 
In a somewhat different vein, the post-crisis proponents of 
so-called “narrow” banking advocate separating banks’ deposit-
taking function from their lending function, thus restricting or 
even taking away banks’ power to create credit and money and 
 
 163. For a comprehensive analysis of U.S. FHCs’ commodities activities in 
the post-1999 era, see generally Merchants of Wall Street, supra note 158. 
 164. Recently, the U.S. regime of separation of banking and commerce came 
under increasing pressure from the financial industry seeking to expand its 
presence in the emerging “fintech” sector, among other things, by acquiring or 
affiliating with various technology firms. Allowing organizational affiliations 
between banks and technology firms, however, would critically undermine the 
public policy goals at the heart of the U.S. bank regulation. It would also poten-
tially open the door to the formation of mega-sized finance-technology conglom-
erates that would take the TBTF problem to a qualitatively new level, both as 
a political matter and as a matter of economic policy. For a detailed discussion, 
see generally Fintech: Examining Digitization, Data, and Technology, Hearing 
Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 
(2018) (written statement of Saule T. Omarova). 
 165. 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2013, S. 1282, 113th Cong. (2013). 
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited organizational affiliations between 
commercial banks and securities firms. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall 
Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.), repealed in part by Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 
(Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
 166. S. 1282 § 3. 
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effectively turning them into “safe” money-market mutual 
funds.167 While some of these proposals would allow “narrow 
banks” to engage in some forms of low-risk lending, others would 
restrict their activities to providing basic payments and safe-
keeping services and investing in government debt and other 
short-term money instruments.168 
All of these proposed approaches—imposition of mandatory 
size caps, revival of the Glass-Steagall regime, and creation of 
“narrow banks”—raise potentially significant design and imple-
mentation issues and, accordingly, invite both serious concep-
tual criticism and politically motivated attacks.169 Whether, and 
under what conditions, any of these specific measures could—or 
even should—become law is a complicated question beyond the 
scope of this discussion. For present purposes, the key point is 
that these ideas define the current range of potential “B” factor 
solutions to the TBTF problem that are far more radical than the 
Volcker Rule or “ring-fencing” reforms, discussed above.170 
Ironically, the radicalism of these proposed structural re-
forms comes fundamentally from recreating ideas born out of the 
Great Depression.171 Of course, that fact does not automatically 
invalidate these proposals. Nevertheless, it raises concerns 
about the extent to which they take into account—and are able 
to reshape or counteract—the systemic dynamics that continue 
to impede effective resolution of the TBTF problem in today’s 
complex world of finance.172 Achieving that lofty goal is likely to 
require a bolder and more comprehensive approach to structural 
 
 167. See, e.g., LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD: ENDING 
THE WORLD’S ONGOING FINANCIAL PLAGUE WITH LIMITED PURPOSE BANKING 
132–34 (2011); Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 357, 411–13 (2016) [hereinafter Safe Banking]; George Pennacchi, 
Narrow Banking, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 141, 148–49 (2012); Arthur E. Wil-
marth, Jr., Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform that Could Solve the Too-Big-
to-Fail Problem and Align US and UK Financial Regulation of Financial Con-
glomerates, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERVICE POL’Y REP. 1, 2 (2012). In principle, 
these proposals build on the idea of “100% reserve banking,” advanced in the 
wake of the Great Depression by economists Irving Fisher and Henry Simons 
and later developed by the Austrian and Chicago school economists. See KO-
TLIKOFF, supra note 167, at 132. 
 168. See Safe Banking, supra note 167, at 411–13. 
 169. For a discussion of these proposals, see Structural Reform, supra note 
74, at 498–500. 
 170. See supra Part II.B (discussing the currently implemented “B” factor so-
lutions). 
 171. KOTLIKOFF, supra note 167, at 132. 
 172. See supra Part III (identifying and discussing the relevant systemic dy-
namics). 
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reform than the “neo-Glass-Steagall” regime or “narrow bank-
ing” are able to offer. 
This new kind of an enhanced structural reform should in-
corporate an explicitly systemic view of finance and draw the le-
gal and regulatory boundaries not simply with an eye to individ-
ual firms’ balance sheets, but with an eye to the functional 
dynamics of the financial market as a whole. Accordingly, these 
reforms would have to pursue a deliberately diverse and ambi-
tious set of policy objectives, well beyond the familiar goals of 
insulating deposit-taking banks from excessive risk-taking and 
minimizing the likelihood and public cost of their failure. Thus, 
these reforms should explicitly seek to reduce the levels of com-
plexity and opacity of the financial system. They should also seek 
to minimize the incentives—or create structural disincentives—
for individual firms to engage in regulatory arbitrage, especially 
in the usual procyclical fashion. Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, these reforms should target the systemic problem of 
continuous credit misallocation and growth of speculative sec-
ondary-market trading. 
To achieve these goals, it might make sense to redefine the 
key structural boundary in the financial sector as that separat-
ing financial institutions whose primary function is to assist 
companies’ and individuals’ capital-raising in primary markets, 
on the one hand, from institutions engaged primarily in facilitat-
ing trading and transfer of financial risk in secondary markets, 
on the other.173 Among other things, this supra-functional ap-
proach to structural reform would refocus regulatory attention 
on the core sources of systemic financial instability: the built-in 
propensity of secondary markets for financial instruments to 
over-generate tradable risk.174 
Needless to say, developing a blueprint for this type of a 
comprehensive and bold structural reform is no easy task. It re-
quires a fundamental attitudinal shift in the debate on the 
 
 173. For an early effort to articulate this supra-functional approach to struc-
tural reform, see Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward 
Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 475–82 (2011) (pro-
posing separate licensing and regulatory regimes for (1) financial institutions 
facilitating “risk transfer” through the creation and trading of complex financial 
products; and (2) financial institutions facilitating more traditional “capital for-
mation” in primary markets). 
 174. For a detailed explanation and a taxonomy of the core meta-transac-
tional techniques for such over-generation of tradable financial risks in second-
ary markets, see Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, supra note 107. 
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proper scope and tools of financial regulation: a shift that in-
volves re-examining underlying assumptions, redefining key 
problems, resetting normative priorities, and recognizing new 
possibilities.175 
B. EXPANDING THE REFORM AGENDA: PRICES, PRODUCTS, 
PUBLIC OPTIONS 
Even the most thoughtfully designed and comprehensive 
structural reform, however, is vulnerable to private market ac-
tors’ attempts to circumvent regulatory boundaries.176 It is, 
therefore, important to expand the reform agenda beyond the 
traditional “B” factor solutions and to start devising policy tools 
that would target undesirable market dynamics directly. In a de-
liberate shift from financial firms’ “bigness” or systemic signifi-
cance to financial markets’ functional mechanisms, these next-
generation “B” factor solutions would seek to reduce and control 
systemic complexity, regulatory arbitrage, and over-generation 
and misallocation of credit. 
1. Systemically Significant Prices 
Among other things, that may mean expanding the concep-
tual framework to incorporate a focus on what has been termed 
“systemically important prices and indices,” or SIPIs.177 SIPIs 
are prices and indices that take on particular market-wide im-
portance, because they are (1) associated with ubiquitous inputs 
to production, (2) associated with highly popular asset classes, 
or (3) used as benchmarks in determining other prices.178 Exam-
ples of SIPIs include prevailing wage and salary rates, certain 
energy and commodity prices, the S&P500 index, the federal 
funds rate, and the leading interbank borrowing rates.179 SIPIs 
play a critical role in the growth, complexification, and volatility 
of financial markets.180 Accordingly, the malfunctioning of the 
 
 175. I intend to develop the basic framework for such an explicitly systemi-
cally oriented approach to structural reform in a separate research project. 
 176. See Structural Reform, supra note 74, at 501–02 (discussing the “bound-
ary problem”). 
 177. See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Systemically Significant 
Prices, 2 J. FIN. REG. 1, 18–20 (2016) [hereinafter Systemically Significant 
Prices] (introducing and discussing the concept of SIPIs, market vulnerabilities 
they create, and regulatory strategies for addressing such vulnerabilities). 
 178. Id. at 3. 
 179. Id. at 27–28. 
 180. For example, until very recently, the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR), a reference rate at which large banks borrowed short-term wholesale 
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mechanisms used to determine individual SIPIs is an important 
potential source of systemic instability. Thus, the process for set-
ting certain SIPIs gives rise to concerns about large-scale market 
manipulation and conflicts of interest likely to have widely dis-
tortive effects on financial markets.181 Moreover, excessive spec-
ulation in assets whose prices are systemically important poses 
a heightened danger of triggering self-reinforcing fire sale spi-
rals across numerous markets.182 
Regulatory measures that minimize market vulnerabilities 
arising in connection with the operation of various SIPIs are, 
therefore, important supplements to the more traditional entity-
focused TBTF solutions.183 Such measures could include the cre-
ation of a special regime for designating particular asset prices 
and indices as SIPIs and subjecting their derivation and mainte-
nance to specially developed regulatory standards.184 Among 
other things, this regime could require licensing of private firms 
that create or maintain specific indices or benchmarks desig-
nated as SIPIs, impose supervisory controls on the process of de-
riving SIPIs, mandate enhanced antitrust and antifraud over-
sight of the relevant markets and activities, or even establish 
some form of public utility-style regulation with respect to cer-
tain SIPIs.185  
2. Financial Product Approval 
Another potential regulatory reform along the same, more 
explicitly macro-structural, lines would introduce a system of 
mandatory pre-approval of financial products, explicitly aimed 
 
funds from one another on an unsecured basis, served as the principal bench-
mark for the vast majority of variable-rate loans, mortgage-backed securities, 
and derivatives traded in global financial markets. As of 2013, LIBOR under-
pinned more than $300 trillion in derivatives contracts alone. See David Hou & 
David Skeie, LIBOR: Origins, Economics, Crisis, Scandal, and Reform, FRBNY 
STAFF REPORTS No. 667, 2–3 (Mar. 2014). 
 181. Recent price-rigging scandals involving LIBOR and foreign exchange 
benchmark rates demonstrate the far-reaching global impact of dysfunctional 
SIPI dynamics. As a result of these scandals, LIBOR is currently being phased 
out. See Jill Treanor, Libor Interest Rate to Be Phased Out After String of Scan-
dals, THE GUARDIAN (July 28, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/business/ 
2017/jul/27/libor-interest-rate-phased-out-scandals.  
 182. For a detailed discussion of market vulnerabilities associated with SI-
PIs, see Systemically Significant Prices, supra note 177, at 10–13. 
 183. For a more detailed discussion of the relevant regulatory measures, see 
id. at 14–20. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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at reducing the complexity and opacity of financial markets.186 
As explained more fully in my prior work, the idea of product 
approval operationalizes a simple but powerful intuition: if we 
cannot effectively regulate and control systemic risk associated 
with the increasing complexity and interconnectedness in finan-
cial markets, we need to reduce and control the overall level of 
complexity in the system.187 Because much of that risk-generat-
ing complexity is a result of strategic efforts of financial firms 
that structure, market, and deal in complex financial instru-
ments, the most radical and direct method of reducing systemic 
risk would be to insert regulatory controls at the point of product 
development, before the risk is introduced into the financial sys-
tem.188 
A properly designed product approval regime would provide 
a procedural mechanism for ensuring that financial innovation 
and the creation of complex financial instruments, in fact, ad-
vance productive economic enterprise and offer real public bene-
fits—as opposed to merely fueling financial speculation and reg-
ulatory arbitrage.189 Under this regime, financial institutions 
would have to demonstrate to the regulators that each complex 
financial product they intend to market meets three statutory 
tests: (1) an “economic purpose” test, which would place the bur-
den of proving the social and commercial utility of each proposed 
financial instrument on the financial institutions seeking its ap-
proval; (2) an “institutional capacity” test, which would require 
a review of the applicant firm’s ability to effectively manage the 
risks and monitor the market dynamics of the proposed product; 
and (3) a broad “systemic effects” test, which would require a 
finding that approval of the proposed product would not pose an 
unacceptable risk of increasing systemic vulnerability and oth-
erwise will not raise significant public policy concerns.190 
 
 186. See License to Deal, supra note 101, at 67 (advancing a proposal for de-
signing a financial product approval scheme). 
 187. Id. at 66. It is worth emphasizing that, in the context of this discussion, 
complexity—of financial instruments, institutions, and markets—is viewed 
merely as a key functional variable driving and explaining an entire complex of 
socially undesirable dynamics in the financial system, and not as some intrinsic 
social “evil.” See id. at 68–75 (discussing the concept of strategic complexity and 
its role in increasing systemic risk). 
 188. Id. at 66. 
 189. For a discussion of how systemic complexity, financial speculation, and 
regulatory arbitrage continue to hinder the effective operation of post-crisis 
TBTF policies, see supra Part III. 
 190. License to Deal, supra note 101, at 67. 
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In essence, this approach would function as a simple bur-
den-shifting device: instead of prohibiting any specific activities, 
it would impose the duty to provide information necessary for 
evaluating potential risks and benefits of a specific financial 
product on the party that has the best access to such infor-
mation—and the greatest incentives not to disclose it voluntar-
ily.191 By eliminating socially counterproductive complexity, this 
approach would also potentially enhance the reliability of tradi-
tional mechanisms of private market discipline.192 
3. Credit Modulation and Allocation 
Another set of unorthodox policy tools may be combined un-
der the general heading of “public options”: i.e., various institu-
tional forms of direct public participation in financial market ac-
tivities. As elaborated elsewhere, public instrumentalities 
already play an indispensable role in making, facilitating, and 
preserving putatively private financial markets.193 They act as 
collective agents, uniquely capable of counteracting and thus 
solving recursive collective action problems permeating the op-
eration of decentralized markets in which they operate.194 Cru-
cially, they act within, not without, the markets—a factor that 
fundamentally changes the way we are conditioned to under-
stand public-private dynamics in finance. As market actors, pub-
lic instrumentalities are able to affect asset prices and shape pri-
vate firms’ behavior in a more nimble and direct way than can 
be done through traditional regulation or supervision. Expand-
ing these participatory capacities of public actors would accord-
ingly amplify this self-correction market mechanism crucial for 
safeguarding systemic financial stability. 
One potential example of such proactive and systematic ex-
ercise of collective agency would be an expansion of the Federal 
Reserve’s so-called “open market operations” (OMO) beyond 
their current focus on interest rate-setting via trading in U.S. 
government bonds, to encompass trading in a wide range of fi-
nancial assets.195 This more comprehensive OMO strategy—or 
 
 191. Of course, designing a workable regime of financial product approval is 
a complex undertaking bound to raise multiple legal, economic, and political 
questions. For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see id. at 113–40. 
 192. Id. at 68–69. 
 193. See sources cited supra note 24. 
 194. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing recursive collective action problems 
in financial markets). 
 195. For a basic description of the mechanism of Open Market Operations, 
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OMO Plus—would aim explicitly to prevent destabilizing asset 
price bubbles and busts, by executing counter-cyclical trades in 
the relevant asset markets.196 In parallel to its existing Treasury 
bond-trading, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) 
would establish a separate trading portfolio replicating the mar-
ket portfolio: effectively, an index fund reflecting the propor-
tional values of all financial asset classes constituting the finan-
cial market as a whole.197 If, for example, a particular asset 
class—such as mortgage-backed securities or technology 
stocks—rises in market value at rates suggestive of a bubble 
trend, the FRBNY trading desk would short these securities, in 
order to put downward pressure on their prices.198 Acting in this 
manner would tend to tighten the flow of speculative credit to 
the asset class in question, both because (1) speculative profit 
prospects would be diminished by the price drop; and (2) the Fed-
eral Reserve’s actions would signal to the market its determina-
tion that current prices of the asset in question are artificially 
inflated.199 Conversely, the FRBNY trading desk would go long 
on particular asset classes when they appear to be artificially 
undervalued. The same process would apply with respect to 
broader market price fluctuations.200 
Another example of a policy directly targeting broad finan-
cial market dynamics would involve an establishment of a new 
federal instrumentality—dubbed elsewhere the National Invest-
ment Authority (NIA)—charged with developing and imple-
menting a comprehensive strategy of national economic develop-
ment.201 This new instrumentality would operate as a true 
hybrid public-private market actor, enabling private investors to 
overcome currently insurmountable collective action problems 
that render investment in long-term public infrastructure pro-
jects individually irrational.202 
 
see ANN-MARIE MEULENDYKE, U.S. MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL MAR-
KETS 163–88 (1998). 
 196. For a more detailed proposal, see Public Actors, supra note 24, at  
141–44. 
 197. This portfolio could be constituted synthetically, rather than through 
the purchase of actual assets—an option with fewer upfront costs. See id. at 141. 
 198. Id. at 142. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. For a detailed proposal, see National Investment Authority, supra note 
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In highly simplified and abbreviated terms, the NIA would 
function much like a typical Wall Street asset manager: it would 
set up a series of collective investment funds (structured simi-
larly to traditional private equity funds), actively solicit private 
investors to purchase passive equity stakes in its funds, and then 
select and manage individual funds’ portfolios of public infra-
structure assets.203 Reversing the fundamental logic of a tradi-
tional “public-private partnership” model, this new entity would 
channel the enormous amounts of private capital held by pen-
sion funds, insurance companies, university endowments, 
banks, foreign sovereign wealth funds, and other institutional 
investors into the coordinated construction and maintenance of 
large-scale, economic growth-boosting infrastructures.204 Exam-
ples of such transformative public infrastructures would include 
nationwide networks of clean energy provision and state-of-the-
art transportation, regional air and water cleaning and preser-
vation programs, systems of ongoing adult education and tech-
nical training, networks of mixed public-private “startup” fi-
nance funds, and so on.205 
At present, private investors are often unwilling to finance 
such socially beneficial projects, primarily because of the longer 
time horizons and higher private risks associated with the pro-
vision of public goods.206 The NIA would act directly and proac-
tively to alleviate these risks. By deliberately exploiting the 
unique advantages of the federal government—its vast scale, 
high risk tolerance, lengthy investment horizons, and direct 
backing by the full faith and credit of the United States—it 
would enable private investors to capture reasonable gains from 
the provision of currently under-provided, transformative collec-
tive goods.207 
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If thoughtfully designed and implemented, this innovative 
reform would open new opportunities for a more effective chan-
neling of financial capital into productive economic enterprise, 
as opposed to socially harmful speculation in financial instru-
ments.208 In this sense, it would significantly enhance the long-
term stability and resilience of the U.S. financial system—and 
blunt some of the key underlying systemic factors that currently 
hinder the ability of traditional TBTF solutions to deliver their 
intended results in practice.209 In a truly organic fashion, an ef-
fective structural rebalancing of the nation’s real economy would 
also help to rebalance, both structurally and functionally, its fi-
nancial system. 
To be clear, the purpose of this brief overview is not to elab-
orate any specific proposal in any significant detail but to pro-
vide some examples of potential avenues for introducing an ex-
plicitly systemic, market-wide perspective in the TBTF policy. 
Supplementing the familiar range of TBTF solutions with these 
types of bolder, broader measures is a critical—and presently 
largely missing—element in the process of eliminating the TBTF 
problem.210 Of course, such unorthodox “public options” as those 
sketched out above are bound to meet with fierce criticism and 
resistance on the part of the financial industry. Even the well-
meaning observers and experts might be hesitant to venture 
quite so far outside the established policy perimeter. Yet, simply 
articulating these innovative options as potential additions to 
the financial sector reform agenda would mark a significant step 
toward a more coherent and integrated strategy of eliminating 
the TBTF phenomenon. Hopefully, for good. 
  CONCLUSION   
“Too big to fail,” or TBTF, is a complex, capacious, and rhe-
torically powerful metaphor. It functions as an “umbrella” term, 
a discursive mirror reflecting the full spectrum of interrelated 
systemic, macro-level problems in today’s finance. At the same 
time, however, TBTF is a fundamentally micro-level, entity-cen-
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tric concept. While largely unacknowledged, this inherent ten-
sion between the micro and the macro, the entity and the system, 
continues to frame the ongoing public policy debate on TBTF. It 
also decisively shaped the design and implementation of the key 
post-2008 regulatory reforms in the financial sector. 
Deconstructing the TBTF metaphor into its two basic com-
ponents—the “F” factor focused on the “failure” of individual fi-
nancial firms and the “B” factor focused on their relative size and 
structural significance—provides a helpful framework for ana-
lyzing post-crisis legislative and regulatory efforts to solve the 
TBTF problem. This analysis reveals critical gaps in the post-
crisis reform process, which consistently favors the inherently 
micro-level “F” factor solutions over the more explicitly macro-
level “B” factor ones. It also suggests potential ways of rebalanc-
ing and expanding the current TBTF policy toolkit to encompass 
a wider range of measures targeting the relevant market-wide, 
or systemic, dynamics in a more direct and assertive manner. 
Pushing the boundaries of our collective understanding of, 
and efforts to eradicate, the TBTF phenomenon by reinstituting 
the importance of self-consciously structural, systemic policy re-
sponses is bound to invite numerous questions and criticisms, 
both constructive and otherwise. There may not be simple an-
swers or bullet-proof defenses to all of them. Yet, the TBTF prob-
lem is not going to disappear unless and until we find better, 
more comprehensive and effective, ways of solving it. By map-
ping out the conceptual terrain on which such solutions may be 
found, this Article is taking a meaningful step toward that goal. 
 
 
